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Federal Practice and Procedure
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-COMMENT-TITLE

VII

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION IN THIRD CIRCUIT DISTRICT COURTS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), 1 which prohibits employment discrimination, 2 class action suits filed
pursuant thereto have become a viable method of attacking discriminatory
hiring practices. A suit does not qualify as a class action, however, unless it
meets the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(rule 23). 3 While the burden of proving that these requirements have been
satisfied is upon the party seeking such certification,' mere repetition of the
language of rule 23 will not meet that burden. 5
In order to comply with rule 23, the mandatory requirements of subsection (a) must initially be satisfied. 6 This subsection requires a showing of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 7 In
addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate the applicability of rule 23(b)(1), rule
23(b)(2), or rule 23(b)(3) to his suit.' Rule 23(b)(1) holds certification ap1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2. Id. Title VII provides in part that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e 2(a)(1).
3. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974). For the pertinent text of rule 23(b), see note 8 infra.
4. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1974); McFarland v. Upjohn Co., 76
F.R.D. 29, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
5. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1969).
6. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1974).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). See notes 20-149 and accompanying text infra.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent parts:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied 'and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
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propriate to prevent separate actions which would bind class members not
parties to the adjudication, impair their ability to protect their rights, or
create inconsistent standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. 9
Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification in a situation in which a party opposing
the class has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making injunctive relief appropriate. 10 Rule 23(b)(3) allows maintenance of a class action when the questions of law or fact common
to the class predominate over those affecting its individual members."
Actions under rule 23(b)(1) require no notice to class members, and the
judgment binds all such members. 12 Notice to potential class members is
required in rule 23(b)(3) actions, however, and an opportunity for class
members to exclude themselves from the class is provided. 13 Rule 23(b)(3)
effectively binds those persons who receive notice of the class action and are
14
not otherwise excluded.
The maintenance of an action as a class action is a discretionary decision
which rests primarily with the federal district courts. 15 Because a federal
appellate court may only review such certification decisions with respect to
abuse of discretion, 16 the determinations of the district courts receive sub(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Id.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). For the text of rule 23(b)(1), see note 8 supra.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). For the text of rule 23(b)(2), see note 8 supra. The text of rule
23(b)(2) describes conduct of the defendant which may give rise to equitable relief. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2). While rule 23(b)(2) contemplates actions for final injunctions or declaratory
judgments, application of the rule operates in suits for other types of equitable remedies. If
subsequent action by a defendant eliminates the need for final injunctive relief, the class action
suit may nevertheless continue under rule 23(b)(2). See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239, 251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Furthermore, some courts have
supported Title VII class action suits formulated under rule 23(b)(2) in which both injunctive
and monetary relief have been granted. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491
F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir.
1969).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). For the text of rule 23(b)(3), see note 8 supra.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Rule 23(c)(3) provides in pertinent part that "[tIhe judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of
the class." Id. Rule 23(c)(4) facilitates this procedure by allowing the court to divide the class
into subclasses or maintain the class action with respect to certain issues. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(4).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
14. See id. Rule 23(c)(2) requires the "best notice practicable under the circumstances" to be
given in a rule 23(b)(3) action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The notice shall advise each member of
his option to exclude himself from the class. Id. Rule 23(c)(3) provides that any class member
given notice under rule 23(c)(2) who fails to opt out of the class shall be bound by any judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
15. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974).
16. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975). In Wetzel, the Third Circuit stated:
[The scope of review] will depend to some extent upon which fact of the multi-faceted
determination is challenged on appeal. The district court must determine if the four pre-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss2/7

2

Editors: Federal Practice and Procedure

1978-1979]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

stantial deference. 17 Consequently, the decisions concerning class action
certification vary. This comment will focus upon class action certification decisions, and will attempt to inform the practitioner of the varying perspectives adopted by district court judges within the Third Circuit to resolve the
issue of class action certification through an examination of their treatment of
the requirements of rule 23 in the context of Title VII actions. 1 8 For purposes of this comment, it shall be assumed that the action is properly before
a district court judge within the Third Circuit.19
II.

APPLICATION OF RULE

23 TO

TITLE VII ACTIONS

A. The Requirements of rule 23(a)
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that "one or more members of a class may sue as
representative parties on behalf of all the class, only if the class is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable." 20 Accordingly, the
burden is upon the representative plaintiff to demonstrate that the class is
large enough to warrant class action treatment and that joinder of all members is impracticable. 2 ' Despite this concept's apparent simplicity, it is a
requisites for a class action listed in rule 23(a) have been met. These are mandatory
requirements, and our review decides whether the mandates have been met. The district
court must also determine whether the class action is maintainable under rule 23(b)(1) or
(2) so that it may proceed without notice to or identification of the class members. Our
review will determine whether the court properly classified the type of class action in
reaching its decision as to class action treatment.
508 F.2d at 245, quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). Similarly, the scope of review of certification decisions was summarized by Professor Moore as follows:
In determining whether an action brought as a class action is to be so maintained the
trial court should carefully apply the criteria, set forth in Rule 23 ....
to the facts in the
case; and if it fails to do so its determination is subject to reversal by the appellate court
when the issue is properly before the latter court. On the other hand, where the trial
court does apply the Rule's criteria to the facts of the case, the trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether the action may be maintained as a class action and its
determination should be given great respect by a reviewing court.
3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.50, at 436-37 (2d ed. 1978). This summary has been
quoted with approval by the Third Circuit in Wetzel and Katz. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 F.2d at 245 n.6; Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d at 757.
17. See note 16 supra.
18. For an excellent discussion of class action requirements, see Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). See also Note, Federal Appellate Review of the Grant or Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 101
(1976); Note, Class Actions in the Seventh Circuit: Appealability of An Interlocutory Order
Denying Class Status, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 462 (1976); Note, Appealability of Class Action
Determinations, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 548 (1975). For a discussion concerning Title VII class
action suits on a more general level, see Janofsky, Class Actions Under Title VII, 27 LAB. L.J.
323 (1976).
19. Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce Title
VII by preventing unlawful employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 & 2000e-5 (1976).
The procedures by which a claim of discrimination reaches the district court are set out in Title
VII. See id. § 2 000e-5(c) to (g).
20. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1).
21. Moore v. Western Pa. Water Co., 73 F.R.D. 450, 452 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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requirement which has raised numerous problems and has generated divergent solutions within the Third Circuit.
The representative plaintiff need not establish class size with precision if
he provides information from which the number of class members can be
approximated.22 In Title VII actions involving past and present employees,
a representative plaintiff often experiences little difficulty in meeting this
requirement because the defendant- employer's records are generally available,
and the defendant-employer is not permitted to argue that its records are
not discoverable for purposes of determining class action status. 23 The problem of numerosity becomes more complicated, however, when future applicants or future employees are involved in the potential class action. In such
a case, the use of statistical evidence is permissible to estimate class size as
long as there is a "logical nexus between that evidence and the issue of class
size." 24 In relying on such evidence, a representative plaintiff may establish, without numeric precision, a class including future victims which meets
25
the requirement of rule 23(a)(1).
An example of the latter situation can be found in Scott v. University of
Delaware,26 where Judge Stapleton granted conditional certification 2 7 to a
class represented by a black sociology professor who was the sole black professor terminated by the University. 28 The court stated that as long as class
22. Walker v. Robbins Hose Fire Co., 76 F.R.D. 218, 222 (D. Del. 1977), citing Moreno v.
University of Md., 420 F. Supp. 541, 564 (D. Md. 1976).
23. Groves v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 433 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In
Groves, plaintiff sought to represent a class of all Negroes currently employed by defendant in
the Philadelphia area, all Negroes who had been employed by defendant in that area between
July 2, 1965 and the date of the suit but were no longer employed, and all Negroes who
unsuccessfully sought employment with defendant between July 2, 1965 and the present date.
Id. at 881. The proposed class consisted of approximately 200 members. Id. Defendant contended that the number was wholly speculative, while plaintiff argued that he could not provide
a more precise figure until discovery had been completed. Id. A contrary rule would necessarily
place the employer in a position in which he could automatically defeat class action status. Id.
In effect, defendant argued that his records were not discoverable because the action should not
proceed as a class suit. Id. If this circular argument had been accepted, a plaintiff would never
be permitted to examine employment records because, without them, a plaintiff would fail to
satisfy the numerosity requirement. Id.
24. Walker v. Robbins Hose Fire Co., 76 F.R.D. 218, 222-23 (D. Del. 1977).
25. Id. at 222. "Future victims" refers to those future employees and future applicants who
will be subjected to the alleged discriminatory practices. Id.
26. 68 F.R.D. 606 (D. Del. 1975).
27. Any district court may grant class action certification on a conditional basis under rule
23(c)(1), which provides: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1). In an unpublished opinion filed September 14, 1976,
the Scott court denied a motion for decertification, stating, that "even if specific enumeration
were possible, the number of past, present and future victims of the discrimination would be of
sufficient size to make that joinder impracticable." Walker v. Robbins Hose Fire Co., 76
F.R.D. 218, 221-22 (D. Del. 1977), quoting Scott v. University of Del., No. 77-58 (D. Del.,
filed Sept. 14, 1976).
28. 68 F.B.D. at 607-09. Defendant contended that since Professor Scott was the only black
professor to have his employment terminated, he would be the sole member of the class of
blacks alleging discrimination with respect to termination and, therefore, the numerosity requirement would not have been met. Id. at 608.
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members were victims of the same policies, 29 the representative plaintiff
need not have been discriminated against in the same manner. 30 The Scott
court thus permitted a class consisting of past, present, and future
employees and applicants, which proved to be of sufficient size to satisfy the
numerosity requirement. 3 1 Accordingly, Professor Scott was permitted to
represent those blacks discriminated against in hiring and recruitment al32
though he had not been discriminated against in that manner.
Subsequently, some district judges concerned with the broad language
of the Scott decision adopted a more restrictive position concerning the use
of future victims to create a class that would comply with rule 23(a)(1). In
Walker v. Robbins Hose Fire Co., 33 Chief Judge Latchum held that each
case must be decided on its particular facts, 34 and rejected the notion
adopted by Scott that a class which includes future victims of discrimination
automatically satisfies the requirement of rule 23(a)(1) if that class cannot be
specifically enumerated. 35 Furthermore, in Martin v. Easton Publishing
Co.,36 Judge Troutman held that the numerosity requirement had not been
satisfied 37 because the grievance of the representative plaintiff was so individualized that no other person was similarly aggrieved. 38 By utilizing this
narrow approach, Judge Troutman denied class certification in apparent con39
trast to the result in Scott.
29. Id. at 607-08. The complaint alleged that the unlawful practices were of a continuing
nature and therefore plaintiff was seeking to represent future blacks as well as those already
suffering from discrimination. Id. at 608.
30. Id. at 608. To support the claim for class certification, plaintiff produced a statistical
comparison of the black faculty members at the university to the available pool of black professors with a Ph.D. Id. The Scott court, however, did not discuss the presentation of this evidence. See Walker v. Robbins Hose Fire Co., 76 F.R.D. 218, 223 (D. Del. 1977).
31. 68 F.R.D. at 608.
32. Id.
33. 76 F.R.D. 218 (D. Del. 1977).
34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. In Walker, plaintiff introduced evidence concerning only the number of blacks in the
area. Id. The statistical evidence consisted of: 1) data indicating that approximately 7,000 blacks
resided in the area; 2) employment records which showed that between 1961 and 1974, no
blacks were employed by defendant; and 3) records which showed that, at the time of the suit,
no blacks were employed by defendant company. Id. At the time of the decision, three black
applicants had been accepted by defendant. Id. n.15.
Judge Latchum ruled that the nexus between the number of black residents and the
number of blacks expected to apply to the company was too tenuous. Id. at 223. Accordingly,
he considered the existence of a class to be mere speculation and held the evidence insufficient
to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Id.
36. 73 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
37. Id. at 683-84.
38. Id. at 683.
39. Id. at 683-84. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. The difference in these decisions may be reconciled by the fact that the Martin court found nofactual allegations to support
the broad conclusory allegations of discriminatory practices. 73 F.R.D. at 681. Specifically,
plaintiff alleged facts which were peculiarly personal to her. Id. She related as an illustration a
particular incident where she was given additional work, which resulted in an argument and
termination of her employment. Id. at 679-80. Additionally, plaintiff failed to contradict defendant's affidavits establishing that no other female had ever been dismissed, that only one other
female ever was transferred from part-time to full-time status within the family section of defendant organization, that no other woman ever was transferred from the family section to the
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The use of future employees and applicants to fulfill the requirement of
rule 23(a)(1) has also been questioned in other contexts with similar conflicts.
For example, in Williams v. Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers International Association,40 Judge Newcomer ruled that the proposed class was sufficiently large to make joinder impracticable and "sufficiently specific that
the Court can, with reasonable ease, determine whether any given person
falls within or without the class." 4 1 Likewise, Judge Huyett certified the
class presented in Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 42 which consisted
of all black persons who had been employed by the defendant in a particular
capacity and all black persons who had applied or will apply in the future for
such employment. 43 Unlike the Williams decision, however, Judge Huyett
44
did not specifically discuss the numerosity requirement of rule 23(a)(1).
In contrast to the perspective developed in Williams and Webb, a less
liberal interpretation of the numerosity requirement has been endorsed by
Judge Teitelbaum. 45 In Moore v. Western Pennsylvania Water Co.,a6 Judge
Teitelbaum rejected the inclusion of future black employees as members of
the proposed class, 47 stating that those potential members "'comprised an
amorphous, phantom group, incapable of identification' in terms of both individuals and numbers." 4 In refusing to certify the class, the district judge
expressed fear that an overbroad framing of the class would be unfair to
absent members and possibly deprive them of due process. 4 9 While the
metro-news section, and that only 11 women ever held similar positions to that of plaintiff. Id.
at 684. In McFarland v. Upjohn Co., 76 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1977), Judge Van Artsdalen took
a similar approach, stating that "[p]laintiff has done no more than offer conclusory allegations
unsupported by factual allegations." Id. at 32. In McFarland, plaintiff alleged that he was black,
that he had been dismissed from employment immediately following an argument, and that he
believed the motivation was racial. Id. at 31.
40. 59 F.R.D. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
41. Id. at 53. The certified class included potential members of Local 19 that had sought
admission to the local, or sought training in sheet metal work in preparation for admission to
the local, or who had sought designation from Local 19 as journeymen sheet workers within the
geographical jurisdiction of Local 19, or who had sought such employment within the geographical jurisdiction of Local 19. Id. at 52.
42. 78 F.R.D. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
43. Id. at 648.
44. Id.
45. See Moore v. Western Pa. Water Co., 73 F.R.D. 450 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
46. 73 F.R.D. 450 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
47. Id. at 454. The two named plaintiffs contended that the seniority system, which required the first person laid off to be the last one hired prior to layoffs, had a disparate effect on
blacks. Id. at 451. The initial hiring of blacks was allegedly a deceptive device to appease racial
tension, placing the blacks in position for imminent layoff. Id. The proposed class also included
five presently employed blacks and seven black employees already laid off but considered by
the court as present employees, bringing the total class, exclusive of future employees, to 14.
Id.at 452. The court held that 14 members did not make joinder impracticable. Id., citing
Giordano v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1950) (16 persons not sufficient
to certify class); Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 106-07 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (23 persons
insufficient); McClinton v. Turbine Support, 68 F.R.D. 236, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (29 persons
not so many as to make joinder impracticable).
48. 73 F.R.D. at 453 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. The court further stated:
In a true class suit the plaintiffs stand in judgment for the class and a judgment for or
against the plaintiffs benefits or binds each member of the class personally under the
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proposed class in Moore 50 was not as specific as the class presented to Judge
Newcomer in Williams, 5 it was nevertheless as specific as the class which
52
was certified by Judge Huyett in Webb.
2. Commonality
Another prerequisite to the maintenance of a class action under rule 23
is the existence of "questions of law or fact common to the class." 5 In
Scott v. University of Delaware,54 Judge Stapleton suggested that for
numerosity purposes, a party discriminated against may represent those who
suffer discrimination in a different manner as long as they are victims of the
same policy. 55 For this reason, Scott held that the class need not be limited
to those persons who had sustained injuries identical to those allegedly inflicted by the defendant on the representative plaintiff. 56 This analysis has
also been utilized in resolving the problem of commonality.
In Karan v. Nabisco, Inc. ,57 Judge Snyder held that although the claims
need not be identical, substantial common questions which warrant a single
suit must exist. 58 He noted that satisfaction of this burden would require a
plaintiff to provide some reasonable basis beyond mere conjecture which
both supports the allegation and presents some indication that the alleged
59
injury was not an isolated incident but rather a policy of the defendant.
While this standard requires more than a mere allegation that defendant
maintained a pervasive policy of discrimination which caused injury to the
entire class, 6 0 Karan indicated that the representative plaintiff need not present a prima facie cas8 showing the likelihood of success on the merits at this
juncture of the proceedings. 6 1 Moreover, where plaintiff alleges discrimina-

principles of res judicata. The members of the class must, therefore, be capable of definite identification as being either in or out of it.
Id., citing Giordano v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1950).
50. 73 F.R.D. at 451. The proposed class was composed of black persons who were
employed or might be employed by defendant at its Pittsburgh plant and those who have been,
continue to be, or might be adversely affected by the discriminatory practices upon which the
complaint was based. Id.
51. See note 41 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The requirement of commonality is closely related to that of
typicality in rule 23(a)(3). A class action that fails to meet the requirements of commonality may
also fail to meet the typicality requirements for the same reasons. This comment shall attempt
to separate the two issues as clearly as possible, although much of the class action case law
discusses the two issues simultaneously.
54. 68 F.R.D. 606 (D. Del. 1975).
55. Id. at 607-08. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
56. 68 F.R.D. at 607-08.
57. 78 F.R.D. 388 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
58. Id. at 403. The need for substantially common questions is mandated by the interests of
judicial economy and convenience, which favor a single suit. Id. Moreover, a single suit is
supported only where these common questions are not obscured by several unique factual and
legal determinations. Id.
59. Id. at 404.
60. id.
61. Id. at 403-04.
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tion in several employment practices at a single facility, Judge Snyder found
it reasonable to infer that all similarly situated employees at that facility
would suffer from the same practices. 62 The same inference was considered
permissible where a complaint involved a national, multifacility employer if
specific terms of employment are uniformly applied to all employees. 6a
Where the members of the proposed class work at various locations and the
specific employment practices vary, however, plaintiff had the burden of
providing evidence indicating that, while local practices differ, these practices form a consistent pattern throughout the system and are imposed by a
central administration which has knowledge of the practices and yet permits
64
them to continue.
In Hannigan v. Aydin Corp., 65 Chief Judge Lord reflected this position
when he determined that the important question concerning commonality
was whether the practice was applied individually or companywide. 66 In
order to resolve this question, Chief Judge Lord suggested that district
judges concentrate on four factors designed to limit the inquiry to the facts
presented. 67 Specifically, these factors were: 1) the nature of the alleged
practice; 2) the structure, size, and location of the company and its
branches; 3) the diversity of the class membership; and 4) the centralization
of management and personnel decisions. 68 In analyzing the issue of commonality, Chief Judge Lord stated that the complaint should be liberally
construed and certification should be denied "only when it it clear that
plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would establish that there was a
company-wide policy of discrimination." 69 Chief Judge, Lord had applied this
62. Id. at 404. Judge Snyder based this inference on the fact that discrimination is class
based and employees at the facility work under nearly identical conditions. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The consistent pattern can be shown by statistical analysis or by evidence that workers at other plants have made similar allegations. Id. The court should decline to determine the
legal sufficiency of any of the factors, but should simply satisfy itself that the allegation is not
frivolous and that common questions will arise which will be addressed at the trial on the
merits. Id. at 405.
The motion for class action certification in Karan was granted on a complaint that alleged
that Nabisco pervasively practiced sex discrimination in its Pittsburgh plant, that the corporate
headquarters knowingly permitted those practices to continue, that statistical evidence comparing women employees in skilled and unskilled positions suggested discrimination consistent with
plaintiff's allegations concerning the Pittsburgh plant, and that this evidenced a companywide
practice. Id. at 404. Plaintiffs also contended that a more specific breakdown of job categories
after discovery would better reveal the questions in common to the class. Id.
65. 76 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 508. The court could not decide the issue of discrimination at this point because
plaintiff had only presented facts sufficient to allege companywide discrimination. Id. at 508. See
also text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
68. 76 F.R.D. at508.
69. Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in compensation and promotional opportunities within the Vector Division of defendant corporation. Id. The proposed class
included all past, present, and future female union and nonunion employees and applicants
from November 8, 1972 to the time of the suit. Id. at 505. The complaint identified employees
other than plaintiff who had suffered injuries similar to plaintiff's. Id. at 508. The court permitted the class to include nonunion employees, and held that the factual allegations were sufficient to include employees in the Vector Division outside of plaintiff's department. Id. at
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liberal approach as early as 1971 to certify a class action in Mack v. General
Electric Co., 70 stating that because a "permeating policy of racial discrimination
is alleged, there can be little doubt that there are questions of law and fact
common to all class members and that the claims of the Negro plaintiffs that
they have been discriminated against will be typical of the claims of other
Negroes." 71
A different problem concerning commonality arose in Dickerson v.
United States Steel Corp. 7 2 In Dickerson, defendants contested the inclusion
of present employees in a class represented by ex-employees on the ground
that they shared no common question of law or fact. 73 While recognizing
legitimate fears in this arrangement, 74 Judge Newcomer nevertheless
granted certification because plaintiffs, who had requested relief which included reinstatement and promotions to the positions they would have acquired but for the discrimination, would be required to show present dis75
crimination in order to prevail on the merits.
While applying the same basic concepts, other courts have taken a stricter approach to satisfaction of the commonality requirement than have Chief
Judge Lord and Judges Stapleton, Snyder, and Newcomer. In Droughn v.
FMC Corp. ,76 Judge Huyett denied class certification to a proposed class of
black female employees of defendant corporation within a specified time
period 77 because the corporation was divided into departments within distinct groups that possessed autonomous and decentralized control of
employment practices. 78 Moreover, Judge Huyett held that plaintiff had
508-09. The court recognized that other courts had heard Title VII cases which had been too
individualized, involving unusual employment decisions or a disciplinary measure affecting
plaintiff. Id. at 508. See, e.g., McFarland v. Upjohn Co., 76 F.R.D. 29, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(plaintiff alleged only that he was black, that he was dismissed following an argument, and that
he believed the motive was racial); Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 73 F.R.D. 678, 680 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (plaintiff dismissed after an argument).
70. 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
71. Id. at 76. Mack was cited with approval in Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641 (E.D.
Pa.), vacated, 64 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1974), where the court stated that "[w]hile it may be
true that in an employment discrimination case there are certain facts which are unique to each
individual claimant, the weight of authority has held that in such cases where a pattern of
discrimination is alleged, the common questions of law and fact predominate." 61 F.R.D. at
642. In Mack, Chief Judge Lord accepted the invitation of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit to apply an "across the board" approach to class actions based on discrimination. 329 F. Supp. at 76. See text accompanying notes 155 & 156 infra.
72. 64 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
73. Id. at 355-56.
74. In cases dismissing ex-employees as representative plaintiffs, judges were concerned
with a lack of personal stake in the outcome by one not seeking reinstatement, or a lack of
personal knowledge on the part of the plaintiff, which is instrumental in proving discrimination.
Id.
75. Id. at 356.
76. 74 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
77. Id. at 640-41. The time period was between September 12, 1966 and February 22, 1973
for employees, and after February 22, 1973 for applicants. Id.
78. Id. at 641. The defendant corporation consisted of three groups, the Corporate Group,
the Machinery Group, and the Chemical Group. Id. The representative plaintiff was employed
in the Management Information Service Department within the Chemical Group. Id. The
Chemical Group employed 15,000 persons in 69 locations. Id.
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failed to identify any particular companywide employment practice. 79 While
plaintiff contended that the alleged practices were symptomatic of a pervasive policy of discrimination, 8 0 the major obstacles to achieving commonality
were the lack of evidence indicating any policy mandated by the national
headquarters and plaintiff's inability to prove that the group in which she
was employed had control over the employment policy within its own division."' Accordingly, because all decisions were made at the department level,
Judge Huyett concluded that the plaintiff could not represent any members
of another group or any members of other departments within her own
82
group.
Similarly, Judge Troutman adopted a strict approach with respect to the
satisfaction of rule 23(a)(2). In Martin v. Easton Publishing Co.,8 3 plaintiff
was dismissed from her employment after an argument following a change in
her work schedule. 8 4 Plaintiff sought class action certification, contending
that her dismissal was predicated on sex discrimination, 8 5 and that other
female employees had been subject to similar action.8 6 Judge Troutman
concluded that the complaint provided no factual allegation applicable to the
class as a whole8 7 and thus rejected her request for certification as being
purely conclusory. 88
3. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties . . [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class." 89 In deter79. Id. at 642. Instead, the court felt that plaintiff had relied on the principle that "across
the board" class actions challenges were favored under Title VII. Id. For a discussion of the
"across the board" approach, see notes 150-63 and accompanying text infra.
80. 74 F.R.D. at 642.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 642-43. Judge Huyett held that plaintiffs could not represent employees of other
departments within the same group. Id. Under similar circumstances, however, Chief Judge
Lord granted certification to a class consisting of employees from other departments within the
Vector Division of the Aydin Corporation. Hannigan v. Aydin Corp., 76 F.R.D. 502, 509 (E.D.
Pa. 1977). See note 69 supra. Similarly, Judge Snyder merely required the allegation of a pattern of discrimination sufficiently common to warrant further discovery and that the corporate
headquarters must have at least known of and permitted these practices to exist. Karan v.
Nabisco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 404-05 (W.D. Pa. 1978). See notes 57-61 and accompanying text
supra.
83. 73 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
84. Id. at 679-80.
85. Id. at 680. Plaintiff contended that she was subject to more difficult schedules than her
male peers, unfair public reprimands, higher standards of subordination, and discriminatory
practices relating to compensation, job assignment, and promotion. Id.
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id. In Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 73 F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1978), plaintiff
similarly attempted to apply a broad class action approach to individual circumstances and was
similarly denied certification. Id. at 128. The Martinez court held that plaintiff had failed to
present any evidence of an identifiable policy but had only applied his "precise and specific
circumstances peculiarly individual and personalized." Id. at 127-28.
88. 73 F.R.D. at 680. Other than the allegations of the circumstances of her dismissal,
plaintiff factually alleged only that her male successor was hired at a substantially higher salary
with regular salary review. Id.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
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mining whether the alleged class satisfies this requirement, many courts
have adopted an analysis similar to that utilized in resolving the question of
commonality. 90 In Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 9 1 Judge Snyder indicated that
the purpose of the typicality requirement was to eliminate unique representatives. 92 Employing the same analysis as that used for resolving the issue of
commonality, 93 the district judge found the typicality requirement satisfied
by a class representing female employees and applicants at eleven Nabisco
94
bakeries.
In Hannigan v. Aydin Corp., 95 Chief Judge Lord approached the requirement of typicality with the same liberal attitude that he had employed
with respect to commonality. 96 He deemed three factors to be relevant in
establishing a nexus between the claims of the plaintiff and those of the rest
of the class: 1) similarity of conditions of employment; 2) similarity of alleged discrimination; and 3) compatibility of the relief requested by the
plaintiff with that appropriate for the class. 97 Recognizing that no'clear
standard exists to determine when the representative plaintiff's claim becomes sufficiently analogous to that of the rest of the class to constitute typicality, Chief Judge Lord suggested that the nexus test be applied liberally so
as to grant certification wherever plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that class
members are subject to similar employment situations or that the class
members' alleged injuries resulted from the practice sub judice. 98
In Williams v. Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers InternationalAssociation, 99 plaintiff was a nonwhite ex-member of Local 19 seeking to represent
nonwhite members, former members, and potential members. 10 0 Defendant challenged the typicality of claims between ex-members and potential
90. See, e.g., Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 405 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Droughn v.
FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639, 642-43 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Scott v. University of Del., 68 F.R.D.
606, 608 (D. Del. 1975); Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 642-43 (E.D. Pa.), vacated, 64 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
91. 78 F.R.D. 388 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
92. Id. at 405, citing 7 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1764, at 614
(1971).
93. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
94. 78 F.R.D. at 403.
95. 76 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
96. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
97. 76 F.R.D. at 508. These factors bear some similarity to the criteria developed by Chief
Judge Lord to resolve the question of commonality. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68
supra.
98. 76 F.R.D. at 508. Plaintiff established this nexus by making identical claims on her
behalf and on behalf of the class, and by identifying other employees suffering similar disadvantages. Id. In addition, plaintiff established a nexus between union and nonunion employees by
establishing that: 1) the discrimination charge arose from a denial of an opportunity for promotion to a position potentially available to union and nonunion employees, thus requiring study of
discrimination as to both types of employees; 2) technical jobs held by nonunion employees
were essentially "male jobs," while nonunion women held only clerical jobs; and 3) defendant
controlled placement of employees. Id. at 509. The court thus concluded that all employees
within the Vector Division of Aydin Corporation were permissible class members. Id.
99. 59 F.R.D. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
100. Id. at 52. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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members on the ground that ex-members may have a self-interest in excluding nonmembers, thereby increasing their own power with the union as
token nonwhites.' 0 ' Following the test endorsed by Chief Judge Lord in
Mack v. General Electric Co.,1 0 2 which permitted representation on the
basis of an alleged general policy of racial discrimination, 10 3 Judge Newcomer stated that a court should not deny class action certification merely on
the "bare possibility that a civil rights plaintiff might cynically not be in fact
concerned with litigating fully the alleged broad policy of discrimination
which he has challenged in his complaint." 10 4 In so doing, Judge Newcomer
espoused a policy that it is in the best interests of both the potential class
and the defendant to finally resolve the issue and thereby avoid continuous
litigation from those denied class status.' 0 5 Similarly, Judge Ditter
suggested in Groves v. Insurance Co. of North America 106 that persons may
assert any particular employment practice as part of a law suit designed to
10 7
challenge all forms of discrimination against the class.
While these policies and factors have been generally adopted, not all
courts have applied them as liberally. As indicated above, 10 8 Judge Troutman denied class action status in Martin v. Easton Publishing Co. 109 because he considered the allegations to be unique and personal to the plaintiff, thereby failing to satisfy commonality and typicality requirements. 110
Subsequently, in Hauck v. Xerox Corp.,"' Judge Troutman again denied
class action certification to a plaintiff who admittedly had supplied more factual information concerning discriminatory practices than had the plaintiff in
Martin. 112 Judge Troutman maintained that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
101. 59 F.R.D. at 53.
102. 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
103. See notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text supra. See also text accompanying notes 155
& 156 infra. In Mack, Chief Judge Lord stated that "[tihe broad Congressional purpose expressed
in the civil rights acts, of eliminating job bias can well be effectuated by allowing any Negro
claiming that an employer has discriminated against him on racial grounds to sue to end all that
employer's racial discrimination." 329 F. Supp. at 76.
104. 59 F.R.D. at 53. For a discussion of "across the board" discrimination, see notes 150-63
and accompanying text infra.
105. 59 F.R.D. at 54. In deciding to grant certification, judge Newcomer expressed apprehension as to the effects of excluding certain persons from the class. Id. Specifically, if the
excluded person had a valid claim, a second suit would be required in order to provide relief.
Id. In addition, if the court found no discriminatory practices, the court would be powerless to
bind excluded claimants, thus subjecting defendant to continual litigation. Id.
106. 433 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
107. Id. at 882-83. Defendant contended that the plaintiff, who had been hired, promoted,
and transferred, voluntarily resigned, and thus was not typical of the class he sought to represent. Id. at 882. Plaintiff, seeking to represent blacks employed, terminated, and rejected by
defendant in the Philadelphia area, contended that defendant discriminated racially in hiring,
training, and promotion as part of a broad pattern of discrimination. Id. at 880-81.
108. See notes 36-39 & 83-88 and accompanying text supra.
109. 73 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
110. Id. at 684. For a discussion of "across the board" discrimination, see notes 150-63 and
accompanying text infra.
111. 78 F.R.D. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
112. Id. at 378. Plaintiff alleged that her male supervisors refused her proper assistance,
denied her deserved promotions so that male employees could be promoted, misled her as to
responsibilities attached to her desired positions to deter her efforts to seek promotion, did not
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commonality and typicality requirements 113 because factual allegations asserted by the plaintiff presented facts, circumstances, and proofs substantially different than those for the rest of the class. 1 14 According to the Hauck
court, permitting a potentially successful litigant to represent the entire class
in such a situation would provide certain parties, who would otherwise fail,
with a "free ride." 115 Conversely, if the class representative were unsuccessful, the otherwise successful parties would be precluded from bringing
individual actions. 116
A comparison of the decisions in Martin and Hauck indicates that Judge
Troutman has advanced both a position denying representative status to a
plaintiff who has provided too few facts to support her assertion and a position refusing certification for providing too many facts, which vary the proof
required. 1 1 7 While these decisions are couched in terms of permitting
maintenance of a class action where there is an identifiable policy or practice
applicable to similarly situated people, 118 the application of that standard by
Judge Troutman clearly has not resulted in class action certification where
the plaintiff alleges some facts to show either similar employment situations
or class injury attributable to a discriminatory practice." 9
Judge Teitelbaum also denied class action status for failure to satisfy
typicality requirements in Fannie v. Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp. 120
In Fannie, plaintiffs alleged a "historical and continuing pattern and practice
of discrimination against female employees" 121 and a discriminatory seniority
treatment, averring that when defendant terminated one of its divisions

inform her of career opportunities, and altered records used for promotions. Id. at 376. Additionally, she charged that in order to retaliate for charging discrimination, the male supervisors
had aided male employees in attempts to pirate her accounts, issued discriminatory performance
appraisals, discriminately increased budget goals, offered her lower compensation and expense
allowances than males in like work, assigned jobs discriminatorily, and prevented her from
attending a conference for which she had been chosen. Id. She also alleged that like treatment
extended to others. Id. at 378. For example, she charged that an interviewer who had denied
her a sales position in Baltimore also harassed another female employee intensely. Id.
113. Id. at 379. The court stated that denying class action status did not mean that other
women would not benefit by plaintiff's case. Id. A recovery would have a deterrent effect on
future discrimination and would establish a beneficial precedent. Id. Compare this view with
the attitude of Judge Newcomer. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
114. 78 F.R.D. at 378-79.
115. Id. at 379.
116. Id.
117. See notes 85-88 & 112-16 and accompanying text supra.
118. 78 F.R.D. at 378.
119. See notes 91-107 and accompanying text supra.
120. 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
121. Id. at 69. The complaint specifically alleged discrimination in the terms and conditions
of employment, of job classifications, and of assignments, in the seniority system, in layoff and
recall practices, in negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, in harassment of females, and in retaliation against those females who filed complaints
concerning discrimination. Id. at 69-70. Additionally, it was alleged that the collective bargaining agreement in effect provided sex based job classifications and compensation scales. Id. at 70.
Moreover, male employees were permitted to work while their female counterparts were laid
off even though the women were senior to the men. Id. For a discussion of rule 23(b)(2), see
text accompanying notes 152 & 153 infra.
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which employed predominantly women, its employees were transferred to a
predominantly male division with a loss of seniority rights.' 22 Plaintiffs also
contended that the operative collective bargaining agreements effectively
perpetuated the impact of past discrimination by locking women into divisions which were no longer operational. 123 Judge Teitelbaum considered
the sole basis of the requested relief to be employer retaliation against those
female employees who had filed complaints of discrimination, even though
2 4
the alleged practices clearly were predicated upon more than retaliation.1
Judge Teitelbaum nevertheless denied certification, reasoning that the typicality requirement had not been satisfied because differing claims existed
between the representative plaintiffs who had refused transfers and other
unnamed plaintiffs who had accepted transfers.' 2 5 Although the complaint
also alleged discriminatory practices occurring after the transfers to the new
division,12 6 the district court dismissed that allegation summarily, holding
that "that which is perceived as discriminatory treatment could merely be a
result of adherence to the new Siding Division Seniority List." 127 In so deciding, Judge Teitelbaum apparently did not apply the nexus test developed
by Chief Judge Lord in Hannigan as liberally as the Chief Judge had contemplated.1 28 Likewise, Fannie failed to reflect the attitude evident in Williams, where Judge Newcomer had determined it to be in the best interest
of both parties to either find discrimination or give a "clean bill of health,"
and had thus permitted ex-members of a union to represent potential members. 129
4. Adequacy of Representation
The final requirement of rule 23(a) is that the representative parties
must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 130 In East
Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez,1 3 1 the United States Supreme Court rejected a class represented by a plaintiff who had sustained no
injury,13 2 thus interpreting this procedural mandate as requiring the representative to have suffered the "same injury as the class represented." 133
In Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.,' 1 34 Judge Newcomer applied this
test to deny a rule 23(a) motion for decertification which contested the inclu122. 445 F. Supp. at 70.

123. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged discriminatory practices resulting after transfer to the Siding
Division, including harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discriminatory job disqualification
practices. Id.
124. Id. at 72. Regarding the alleged discriminatory practices, see note 121 supra.
125. 445 F. Supp. at 70-72.
126. See note 123 supra.
127. 445 F. Supp. at 72 (emphasis added).
128. For Chief Judge Lord's nexus test, see text accompanying note 97 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
131. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
132. Id. at 403-04.
133. Id. at 403.
134. 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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sion of present employees in a class represented by ex-employees. 135 The
Dickerson plaintiffs were pursuing claims for relief from injuries to the class
and to themselves. 136 In doing so, Judge Newcomer interpreted Rodriguez
as being primarily directed at the adequacy of the named representatives
rather than at the similarity of claims. 13 7 Adopting this position, Judge
Stapleton found a lack of adequate representation in Jenkins v. General
Motors Corp.'138 There the plaintiff had not been employed by General
Motors for over four years and did not seek reinstatement, yet desired to
39
represent a class including present employees.'
Additionally, Judge Snyder noted in Karan that district courts must be
aware of collusion and of ignoring issues, must assure competent presentation of the cases, and must determine whether the trial would be thorough
and fair as a single suit in order to ensure adequacy of representation.140 To
facilitate these objectives, Judge Snyder pointed out that a district court
should review the manageability of the case and the competence of counsel,
and should determine whether any antagonism exists between the plaintiff
and the class.14' Moreover, the court may bifurcate the trial on liability and
individual relief to further adequacy of representation. 142
In ascertaining whether the requirement of adequacy of representation
has been met by the named plaintiff, the ability of the plaintiff's attorney
43
In Allen v. Butz, 14 4
and the character of the plaintiff is also considered.1
Judge Green determined that this requirement had not been satisfied because the plaintiff had changed counsel several times, suggesting an unstable
attorney-client relationship. 14 5 Moreover, in Cobb v. Avon Products,
Inc., 146 the court refused the named plaintiff's request to represent the class
because she had been working for another company while employed by the

135. Id. at 62. See -notes 27 & 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
136. 439 F. Supp. at 61. The court stated that when the class is certified and the plaintiffs do
not prove their own injuries, the class claims would have already been presented in toto and
thus the class would not be affected as to its ability to bring a class action. Id. at 61-62.
137. Id. at 61.
138. 354 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1973).
139. Id. at 1042-43. The court found that such a plaintiff would have no interest in establishing discrimination because he had left General Motors. Id. at 1044. The class included blacks
who were employed or might be employed at General Motors' Wilmington, Delaware, plant,
and those who had been, continued to be, or might be adversely affected by the practices
complained of. Id. at 1043.
140. Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 406 (W.D. Pa. 1978). The requirement of
adequacy of representation has assumed significant importance with the advent of stricter res
judicata rules. Id. at 405. For a discussion of the binding effect of class action decisions, see
notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
141. 78 F.R.D. at 406.
142. Id. Judge Troutman did not choose to utilize this method in Martinez, although it was
arguably appropriate. See note 87 supra.
143. See, e.g., Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 643 (E.D. Pa.), vacated, 64 F.R.D. 393
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Williams v. Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 49, 55
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
144. 390 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
145. Id. at 841.
146. 71 F.R.D. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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defendant. 147 The Cobb court found that plaintiff lacked sufficient attentiveness to the needs of the class and held that such attentiveness was a
requisite to adequate class representation. 148 In addition to character,
Judge Teitelbaum has noted that financial status of the plaintiff is relevant,
but not conclusive, in determining whether a plaintiff may adequately repre149
sent a class.
B. Requirements of rule 23(b) and
the "'Across the Board" Approach
In addition to compliance with the requirements of rule 23(a), a plaintiff
seeking class action status must also meet one of three requirements of rule
23(b): 1) in a situation where class action would be appropriate, separate
actions would bind class members not parties to the action, or create inconsistent standards of conduct, rule 23(b)(1); 2) in a situation where the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the
class as a whole, rule 23(b)(2); or 3) in a situation where common questions
of law or fact predominate over individual questions, rule 23(b)(3). 150 Because a Title VII action against discriminatory employment practices is
necessarily a suit to end common class based discrimination, compliance
with rule 23(b)(2) is usually sought by potential class action plaintiffs.'' Appropriately, the drafters of rule 23 contemplated that suits against employment discrimination would be maintained under rule 23(b)(2). 152 Under this
section, the conduct of the employer is normally alleged to be actionable "on
grounds generally applicable to the class," and relief is sought "with respect
to the class as a whole." 153

147. Id. at 654-55.
148. Id. at 655.
149. Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229 (W.D. Pa. 1977). In Emery, the court
stated:
Seeking to represent a large group of people as a class representative in a lawsuit is a
very heavy responsibility. It should never be undertaken lightly, and the court should
allow such representation only upon a firm foundation that the named plaintiffs are willing and financially able to shoulder that burden .... Inadequatefinancing threatens the
procedural and substantive interests of all members of the class.
Id. at 231, quoting Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
150. For the requirements of rule 23(b), see notes 8-14 and accompanying text supra.
151. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975). For the text of rule 23(b)(2), see note 8 and accompanying text supra.
152. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendment to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102
(1966). Since actions which satisfy the requirements of rule 23(b)(2) usually comply with rule
23(b)(3) as well, the action should proceed under rule 23(b)(2) so that the class members will be
bound by a thorough and conclusive adjudication. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239, 252-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). See also note 10 supra. Under
rule 23(b)(3), members of the class can opt out, and thereby not be bound by the adjudication.
508 F.2d at 252. See note 14 supra.
153. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has been instrumental in the expansion of class action suits in the civil rights area, holding that "racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination." 15 4 In
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,1 55 the Fifth Circuit established a
broad "across the board" approach to Title VII class action suits by stating
that "while it is true . . . that there are different factual questions with regard to different employees, it is also true that the 'Damoclean threat of a
racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] is a question of
fact common to all members of the class."' 156
1 57
The Third Circuit has also adopted this "across the board" approach.
Chief Judge Lord reflected this attitude in his opinion in Mack v. General
Electric Co. ,158 in which he recognized that some jurisdictions had refused
to accept the Fifth Circuit's "across the board" concept, but continued:
We do not so decline. While discrimination exists and has existed
nationwide, because discrimination has been more overt in the
states of the Fifth Circuit that court has become very experienced
in and sensitive to the subtle problems of racial discrimination.
Congress has taken great strides to legislate bias out of our
economy. Given the tools that Congress has now provided, courts
59
would be remiss if they were not used to the fullest extent.1
0
Furthermore, in Martin v. Easton Publishing Co.,16 Judge Troutman
stated:
[T]he 'across the board' approach may properly be applied to
situations where an aggrieved plaintiff was affected by an identifiable policy or practice obviously applicable to others in like status
...or . . . where it was admitted that the policy or practice identified was applied to all employees and hence all members of the
class. 161
154. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
155. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
156. Id. at 1124, quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn.

1966).
157. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Irks. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1911 (1975). See also notes 158-63 and accompanying text infra.
158. 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
159. Id. at 75-76. This approach has been reaffirmed as the law of the Third Circuit. See
Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Furthermore, in Jones v. United
Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. I (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court stated:
While there may be some factual differences in the situations of individual class members,
it would unduly restrict the remedial purposes of this civil rights legislation to fragment or
dissolve a class action because of such nuances, when racial discrimination has been
broadly alleged and all class members are potential victims of that discrimination.
Id. at 21.
160. 73 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
161. Id. at 683 (emphasis by the court). The court found the Wetzel court's use of the words
"homogeneous" and "cohesive" in its description of rule 23(b)(2) actions indicative of the fact
that rule 23(b)(2) actions require that the interests of class members be so similar to those of the
plaintiff that injustice wll not result from their being bound by the judgment through application of res judicata principles. Id. For the text and a discussion of rule 23(b)(2), see notes 8 & 10
and accompanying text supra. Judge Troutman denied class action status in Martin because
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While the "across the board" approach satisfies the requirement of rule
23(b)(2), that approach is less significant where various employment conditions are at issue. In Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,1 62 Judge Huyett
noted that the approach adopted by Judge Troutman in Martin may limit the
applicability of the "across the board" analysis where the conditions of
employment for all employees vary according to the particular employee's
trade, union, or situs of work. 163 Compliance with rule 23(b)(2) thus involves a consideration of homogeneous groups and claims similar to the issues involved in determining compliance with the requirements of rule
23(a).1 64 Without this close relationship between the representative plaintiff
and the potential class, the request for certification will be denied. Because
this comment deals with class action certification in the context of Title VII
suits, the requirements of rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3), which are not generally
165
applicable thereto, will not be discussed.
III. CONCLUSION
While this survey did not concentrate upon the propriety of the decisions interpreting the requirements of rule 23 in the context of Title VII
class actions, some pertinent observations may be made concerning the initiation of a Title VII class action suit in the district courts of the Third Circuit.
As a practical matter, when contemplating a class action suit under Title
VII, the practitioner should ascertain whether the representative plaintiff is
able to finance the lawsuit 166 and maintain a stable relationship with the
attorney and class members. 16 7 Attorneys should also consider the standards announced in Hannigan by Chief Judge Lord in order to comply with
168
the commonality and typicality requirements of rule 23(a).
Furthermore, the allegation of discrimination in the complaint should
be supported by facts sufficient to allege a policy of discrimination while
1 69
avoiding specificity which would cast the suit in a personalized light.
Compliance with one of the requirements of rule 23(b) is attained most easily through rule 23(b)(2) because it was designed for this type of class action
suit. 170 Most importantly, however, is the ability of the practitioner to understand fully the requirements imposed by the presiding judge. In light of

plaintiff's claim was too particularized. 73 F.R.D. at 684. However, the principle outlined in
Martin for use of the "across the board" concept has been utilized to certify class actions. See
Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 645, 649-50 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
162. 78 F.R.D. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
163. Id. at 649-50.
164. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975).
165. See notes 9 & 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See
See
See
See
See

note 149 and accompanying text supra.
text accompanying notes 144-48 supra.
notes 65-69 & 95-98 and accompanying text supra.
notes 109-19 and accompanying text supra.
notes 151-53 and accompanying text supra.
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the discretion conferred upon the district court judges in class action suits
preparation in this area will permit an attorney to anticipate the requirements of a particular judge and to adequately comply with them.
Keith D. Heinold
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POST-Monell

VIABILITY OF IMPLIED FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES AND EXERCISE OF PENDENT JURISDICTION
OVER STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT.

I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,'
the United States Supreme Court permitted a suit against a local governmental unit under section 1983,2 thereby reversing its longstanding construction of the term "person" 3 in section 1983 as excluding local governments. 4

Prior to Monell, civil rights litigants often attempted to circumvent

1. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). This section of the United States Code codifies the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
ld.
The jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983 is § 1343(3) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1976). Section 1343(3) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,
id.
3. 436 U.S. at 690. In Monell, the Supreme Court qualifiedly overruled Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar as Monroe held that local governments were not "persons" properly
suable under § 1983. Id. In Monroe, the Supreme Court had viewed the legislative hearings for
the proposed Sherman Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as evidencing congressional
intent to exclude municipalities from the definition of a "person" suable under § 1983. 365 U.S.
at 188-92. On three subsequent occasions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Monroe. See Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1973);
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973). In Monell, however, the Supreme
Court reevaluated its prior interpretations of congressional intent and concluded that a municipality may be sued under § 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury . . . [for which] the government as an entity is responsible." 436 U.S.
at 694. The Monell Court nonetheless affirmed Monroe insofar as it held that respondeat
superior could not be a basis for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees. Id. at 691.
4. 436 U.S. at 660. The plaintiffs in Monell were female employees of the Department of
Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York. Id. These plaintiffs initiated a § 1983 action against the department and its commissioners, the board of education and
its chancellor, and the city, challenging a policy requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before such were necessary. Id. at 660-61. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board of Education was not a "person" under § 1983,
and hence was immune from a § 1983 award of damages. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of the
City of New York, 532 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the Second Circuit maintained that although the individual officials were "persons" properly suable under § 1983, it

(314)
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this restriction 5 since direct municipal liability for the unconstitutional conduct of municipal agents afforded substantially higher recoveries than suits
brought against the local officials individually. 6 For example, litigants at-

would not allow a damage suit to proceed against these individuals in their official capacities
because an award would "have to be paid by a City that was held not to be amenable to such an
action in Monroe v. Pape." Id. at 265. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider "[wihether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is
sought against them in their individual capacities." 436 U.S. at 662.
5. Litigants have attempted to evade Monroe's § 1983 proscription against suing
municipalities by bringing municipal defendants into federal court through alternate methods.
Some litigants have sought to hold municipalities liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (§ 1981). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by %thitecitizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and to no other.
Id. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether municipalities are liable under
§ 1981, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 654 n.3 (1977), some federal courts, including the
Third Circuit, have affirmatively allowed recovery against municipalities on this basis. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1978); Mahone v. Waddle, 564
F.2d 1018, 1022-24 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). For a discussion of
Mahone, see notes 51-64 and accompanying text infra.
Other litigants have sought to invoke the fourteenth amendment to hold municipalities
directly liable for the constitutional violations of their agents. See cases cited note 12 infra.
These plaintiffs have argued that the federal court should imply a damage remedy against
municipalities directly under the fourteenth amendment in the same way as the Supreme Court
implied a damage remedy against federal agents for fourth amendment violations in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
A third approach utilized to evade the limitations of § 1983 has been to acquire federal
jurisdiction through the assertion of an implied fourteenth amendment claim, and thereafter
seek to have the district court exercise its pendent jurisdiction over state law claims against a
municipality. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
904 (1978); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1978). For a discussion of
these three methods, see, Note, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal
Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409 (1978).
Certain attempts to circumvent the pre-Monell proscription against suing municipalities
under § 1983 have been efpressly rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (plaintiffs sought to append state law damage claims against a municipality
to a § 1983 suit against individual officials); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973)
(plaintiffs contended that the § 1983 proscription barred only legal, not equitable, relief against
municipalities); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (plaintiff contended that when
a state stripped a municipality of immunity by statute, there remained no bar to § 1983 damage
actions). See generally Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. Rev. 131, 147 (1972).
6. Civil rights litigants confront at least four major difficulties in actions against
public individuals. First, plaintiffs risk preclusion from recovery in some civil rights cases because it may be difficult to identify the individual officials responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. See Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279-84 (3d Cir. 1972) (affirming a directed
verdict for two police officers alleged to have brutally beaten the plaintiff in a police station, on
the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove whether the defendants were the policemen who
actually administered the beating). Second, there is the risk that many officials lack the financial
means to pay substantial judgments. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966)
("Neither the personal assets of the policemen nor the nominal bonds they furnish afford
genuine hope for redress"). Third, plaintiffs risk that a jury may be reluctant to impose money
damages on an official whom they perceive to, be merely performing his official duties. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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tempted to avoid the pre-Monell construction of section 1983 by asserting
their claims against a municipality directly under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 7 Subject matter jurisdiction in these cases was
established through the pertinent federal question provision of section
1331(a) of the Judicial Code.8 To substantiate these fourteenth amendment

Finally, local officials, even when they have violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights, enjoy a
good faith defense to a § 1983 action. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (to hold an
individual liable under § 1983, proof must show the defendant's personal responsibility for the
allegedly unconstitutional acts and their duty to know of or actual knowledge of constitutional
requirements); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974) (immunity existed if the conduct
was, in light of all the circumstances, reasonable and ifi good faith); Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976). Where a
municipality retains counsel, however, it may be proper to assume that the municipality acted
with knowledge of existing constitutional limitations, and civil rights plaintiffs may therefore
overcome the immunity defense when appropriate. See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 770,4794 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. West Haven v.
Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (1978), on remand, (Second Circuit), (Jan. 30, 1979); Cox v. Stanton,
529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law .... ." Id. In order to establish a cause of action directly against a municipality for denial of
due process, many plaintiffs have attempted to analogize the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), wherein the Court directly implied a
damage remedy for illegal search and seizure under the fourth amendment. See id. at 395-96;
notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text infra. While the Supreme Court has not conclusively
decided that an implied fourteenth amendment claim exists for civil rights litigants, the position
has received support from Justices Marshall and Brennan. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring).
8. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Sixth Camden
Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F.
Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Cf. Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366, 1378
(W. D. Pa. 1974) (in passing § 1331, Congress did not intend that federal courts should judicially infer the simultaneous creation of a cause of action for money damages against a municipality when Congress itself had specifically considered and refused to legislatively create such
liability in passing § 1343(3) and § 1983).
9
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). Specifically, § 1331(a) of the Judicial Code provides in
pertinent part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that an implied fourteenth amendment cause of action
for damages against a municipality "arises under" the Constitution, and therefore establishes
federal subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331(a). Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1976); City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1973). It is important to note, however, that the question concerning
the viability of a fourteenth amendment claim is distinct from the Court's conclusion that assertion of the constitutional cause of action provides a district court with subject matter jurisdiction. Significantly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that, while'a federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the 'matter, the claim may not be one upon which relief
may be granted. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946). Specifically, the Bell Court
explained:
Before deciding that there is no jurisdiction, the District Court must look to the way the
complaint is drawn to see if it is drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the
Constitution and laws of the United States ....
[W]here the complaint . . . is so drawn
as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the
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claims, these plaintiffs often have attempted to analogize their claims to
those in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 9 wherein the Supreme
Court recognized an implied cause of action against federal officers for fourth
amendment violations despite the absence of a statutory remedy. 10 Since

The reason for this is that the court must
federal court . .. must entertain the suit ....
assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the
court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy.
[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits
[..
and not a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the primary restriction upon the exercise of
jurisdiction by a federal court is the requirement that the claim be substantial. See Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974). With regard to fourteenth amendment allegations, the
Supreme Court has recognized the substantiality of that cause of action. See Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 279.
9. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
10. Id. at 397. The Bivens Court held that federal courts may award damages against federal
agents for violating the fourth amendment proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. Construing this result broadly, Bivens became the first Supreme Court decision to definitively recognize that denial of a constitutional right may give rise to a cause of action for damages, even in the absence of a statute which authorizes such legal action. See Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1542 (1972). Some
authorities, however, have narrowly viewed Bivens as providing only a remedy for victims of
unconstitutional federal action which is not covered by section 1983 since that statute applies
solely to state action. See Note, supra note 6, at 932.
Underlying the entire discussion concerning the extension of Bivens to suits against
municipalities is the basic question of whether federal courts have the power to create a damage
remedy for violations of a constitutional right. 403 U.S. at 401-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). See
Dellinger, supra, at 1540-43; Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 181 (1969); Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969). In his majority
opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that damages were an appropriate remedy for breach of
fourth amendment rights because damages were "[h]istorically ... the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty." 403 U.S. at 395. Justice Brennan was persuaded that
the power of the Court to imply a damage remedy was particularly strong because there existed
"no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Id.
at 396. Furthermore, the majority rejected the idea that congressional failure to provide a
statutory cause of action reflected a federal fiscal policy against an award of damages for fourth
amendment violations by federal officers. Id. Justice Brennan concluded that a damage action
was the normal "remedial mechanism available in federal court" and that, in the absence of an
explicit congressional declaration, a damage remedy should be permitted. Id. at 396-97.
In his concurrence, however, Justice Harlan emphasized that the Court had repeatedly
implied private damage remedies for violations of federal statutes if such remedies were appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the statute. Id. at 402 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring). He also
argued that the inherent power of a federal court to grant equitable relief based upon the
Constitution necessarily implied a similar power to grant a traditional remedy at law. Id. at
404-05 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967).
Moreover, Justice Harlan stated that the power of the judiciary to imply a damage remedy
based directly on the Constitution depended on "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or
,appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted." 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the "necessary or appropriate" standard, see Hundt, supra note 6, at
770; Dellinger, supra note 10, at 1543-52.
In contrast, the dissenting Justices in Bivens felt that the Court was engaged in "an exercise of legislative power that the Constitution does not give us." 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J.,
dissenting). The rationale of the majority in Bivens, however, has been extended by the federal
courts to imply a damage remedy against federal agents for constitutional violations other than
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (court extended rationale of Bivens to provide a remedy for violation of the first amendment); United
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the Supreme Court has expressly reserved decision on the merits of extending Bivens to suits against local governmental units," however, the propriety of recognizing this direct constitutional remedy has been sharply debated
in the lower federal courts. 12 Another method of redress has been to establish federal jurisdiction through such a constitutional claim and then obtain
federal adjudication of state law tort claims against the municipality through
pendent jurisdiction.13
This comment will discuss the approach taken by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to the implied fourteenth amendment
remedy, 14 and, in light of Monell's holding that municipalities are "persons"
suable under section 1983, will analyze the continued vitality of the Third
Circuit's pendent jurisdiction approach. 15
II. PRE-Monell MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

A. Implied Fourteenth Amendment Approach
Prior to Monell, the district courts in the Third Circuit debated the
extension of the Bivens rationale to enable civil rights plaintiffs to sue local
governments. 16 This debate stemmed in part from divergent philosophies

States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (Bivens analysis adopted to allow
damage recovery for fifth amendment violation).
11. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
12. Generally, some federal courts have been reluctant to extend the rationale of Bivens
beyond the federal level to impose liability upon municipalities because such extension would
conflict with established principles of federalism. See, e.g., Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp.
848, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 230-31 (D. Conn. 1974). In
addition, some courts have held that the recognition of a damage remedy against municipalities
for violations of the fourteenth amendment would countermand the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1983,. See notes 16 & 92 and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment, Municipal Liability for Constitutional Violations: Can You Fight City Hall? A Survey of the Circuits,
16 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 572
F.2d 98 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 99 (1978); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d
1018 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). See notes 36-83 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (where no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over a municipality exists, a municipal party may not be joined as a pendent party in an action to adjudicate
state law claims against that party arising out of the same facts as the federal claim against
individual defendants).
14. See notes 16-35 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 84-105 and accompanying text infra.
16. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, at least
nine decisions have declared that a cause of action against a municipality exists under the fourteenth amendment. See Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Santiago v. City of
Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F.
Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Pinto v. Clark, 407 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Santore v. City
of Philadelphia, No. 76-904 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 28, 1976); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No.
75-3662 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 7, 1976); Rice v. City of Philadelphia, No. 73-893 (E.D. Pa., filed
Jan. 22, 1976); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Maybanks v.
Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1974). However, at least five decisions in this district
have held to the contrary. See Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.
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concerning the propriety of recognizing the fourteenth amendment remedy. 17 In addition, three early decisions by the Third Circuit suggested to
some district court judges that the Third Circuit had at least impliedly, if not
expressly, recognized a Bivens cause of action. '8
In Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,19 the
Third Circuit remanded the case for a factual determination 2 0 of the corpoPa. 1977); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1976) vacated and remanded, 572
F.2d 98 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 99 (1978); Anderson v. Erwin, No.
76-2020 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 20, 1976).
17. See, e.g., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Pitrone v. Mercadante,
420 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated and remanded, 572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 99 (1978). Some district courts which refused to imply a direct remedy
against municipalities under the fourteenth amendment determined that such relief was not
necessary and appropriate." 426 F. Supp. at 395. Judge Becker explained:
[Bly necessity we mean only that the implication of a particular remedy under a constitutional provision must further some identifiable purpose of that provision in some important respect. By appropriateness we mean that the decision whether to imply a particular
remedy must also take into account other relevant circumstances including the undertakings of Congress in the area, the overall feasibility of evaluating the necessity of a proposed remedy from a judicial rather than a legislative standpoint, and any countervailing
considerations.
Id. at 394. Applying these standards to the alleged fourteenth amendment claim, Judge Becker
found the claim unnecessary because § 1983 provided adequate relief for civil rights litigants.
Id. at 395. Moreover, the district judge concluded that such relief was inappropriate in light of
congressional intent in promulgating § 1983. Id.
Other opponents of the implied fourteenth amendment cause of action have based their
decisions on principles of federalism. See Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
In Jones, Judge Luongo noted that "federalism mandates caution in imposing new sources of
liability against municipalities, particularly in light of the increasingly acute social and financial
problems confronting them." Id. at 860.
On the other hand, some district courts recognized the validity of the fourteenth amendment claim by extending the theory of respondeat superior liability to municipalities. See, e.g.,
Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Culp, Judge Newcomer noted that the City of Philadelphia, as an
employer, should be liable for its employees because
[i]f the employer is a proper party, then the ordinary common law principles of vicarious
liability should be applied. Such liability provides a "deep pocket" from which a plaintiff
can collect a judgment, and it imposes liability on an entity which hired the police officer
and gave him the opportunity to commit a constitutional violation.
437 F. Supp. at 24 (citation omitted). Furthermore, in Santiago, Chief Judge Lord explained
that this extension of liability to municipalities "is reasonable since the employer, rather than
the injured party, is in a better position to absorb the costs, insure against them and distribute
the costs to society." 435 F. Supp. at 148, citing W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 459 (4th ed.
1971). For a discussion of respondeat superior liability of municipalities for the unconstitutional
conduct of their agents, see Hundt, supra note 6, at 780-83; Note, 65 GEO. L. J. 1483, 1522
n.158 (1977); Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 850 (1974).
18. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); McCullough v. Redevelopment Authority, 522 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31
(3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975).
19. 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983
(1975).
20. 501 F.2d at 45. Several factual determinations were called for, including the directive
that the district court consider whether the defendant's actions were reprisals against the plaintiff for exercising his first amendment rights. Id. Specifically, Bloomsburg State College had
decided to terminate the plaintiff's contract and discharge him during the 1970-1971 academic
year. Id. at 34. In bringing this action, Skehan contended that the decision to terminate his
contract constituted a denial of procedural due process. Id. at 36. Furthermore, the plaintiff
alleged that the decision to terminate his contract, and his subsequent discharge, were moti-
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rate status of Bloomsburg State College 21 after holding that, while the
eleventh amendment would bar suit if the college were a state governmental
unit,2 2 the college could be sued under section 1331(a) if it had a separate
corporate existence. 2 3 The Skehan court maintained that "the fact that the
College is not a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not
significant .... There is § 1331 jurisdiction to award relief against the college if under Pennsylvania law it is not an agency of the Commonwealth
24
covered by the Commonwealth's immunity."
Subsequently, in McCullough v. Redevelopment Authority 25 the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial on the merits of a fourteenth
amendment equal protection challenge against the Redevelopment Authority
of Wilkes-Barre. 26 Implicit in the McCullough court's ruling was the
suggestion that the plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be

granted, but that he could not prevail on the merits since he had not sustained the burden of proving equal protection violations.2 7
Finally, in Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,28 the district court dismissed a complaint asserting section 1983 claims against a municipal defendant. 2 9 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated this dismissal and remanded
vated by his exercise of his first amendment rights. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the
district court did not fully consider whether the plaintiff's discharge was at least partially based
on activities protected by the first amendment. Id. at 39-40. The Third Circuit also remanded to
the district court the issue of whether the plaintiff had an additional contractual right to a
hearing prior to discharge under state law. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 41-42. Specifically, the eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment has been
construed to bar suits by the citizens of one state against that state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). Furthermore, the defense of
sovereign immunity can only be waived by the express consent of the state. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
In Skehan, the Third Circuit held that if the college were a state governmental entity, the
defendant could assert the sovereign immunity protection of the eleventh amendment on appeal. 501 F.2d at 42.
23. 501 F.2d at 41. For the pertinent text of § 1331(a), see note 8 supra.
24. 501 F.2d at 44.
25. 522 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. Id. at 880. In McCullough, plaintiffs were owners of flood damaged houses who alleged
that they were entitled to have their residences acquired rather than rehabilitated by the Redevelopment Authority. Id. at 861. The court of appeals found that jurisdiction over the governmental agency was properly founded upon § 1331(a). Id. at 864. The plaintiffs alleged that
the property acquisition criteria established by the Redevelopment Authority denied the plaintiffs equal protection since unequal burdens were placed on the plaintiffs to rehabilitate their
flood damaged property while similarly damaged property was being acquired as part of the
agency's urban renewal project. Id. at 873-74.
27. Id. at 880.
28. 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976). The plaintiff in Rotolo was terminated from his employment as a building contractor for the defendant, a municipal corporation. Id. at 921. The plaintiff alleged that four borough councilmen voted to terminate his employment because he had
exercised his first amendment rights. Id. Plaintiff instituted civil rights actions under § 1983
against the individual defendants and the Borough of Charleroi, seeking both monetary and
injunctive relief. Id.
29. Id. at 921.
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with instructions to permit the plaintiff "to amend the jurisdictional allegations in those parts of his complaints relating to the Borough of Charleroi"
to allege jurisdiction under section 1331.30
In evaluating the precedential effect of Skehan, McCullough, and
Rotolo, several district court judges have reached inconsistent results. While
some district courts have held that this series of cases expressly recognized a
Bivens cause of action in municipal discrimination liability claims, 31 other
district judges have indicated that the Third Circuit only sustained federal
subject matter jurisdiction therein and did not resolve the substantive issues. 32 This uncertainty was further reflected in subsequent opinions of the
Third Circuit wherein individual appellate judges debated the holdings of
Skehan, McCullough, and Rotolo. 33 The Third Circuit ended this debate in
30. Id. at 922. The Third Circuit found that the lower court had properly applied Monroe to
exclude the Borough of Charleroi from suit under § 1983. Id, The court noted, however, that
plaintiff could have established jurisdiction over the municipality under § 1331(a) even though
he made no mention of the federal question statute in his complaint. Id. The court therefore
directed the lower court to afford plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint. Id. at
922-23.
31. See, e.g., Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sixth
Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976); Patterson v. City of
Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Drennon, Judge Higginbotham stated clearly
the position of those advocating the extension of the Bivens rationale to municipal liability:
In view of the allegation of the 14th Amendment violations . . . the plaintiff's claims
obviously arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States. That violations of a
person's constitutional rights can give rise to a cause of action for damages against a city
and a municipal agency or instrumentality has been well established.
428 F. Supp. at 812 (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Pitrone v. Mercadante,
420 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated and remanded, 572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 99 (1978). Significantly, these district courts interpreted Skehan as narrowly holding that a nonfrivolous claim brought under the fourteenth amendment provided the
federal court with subject matter jurisdiction. See Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. at 1388
n. 10. Furthermore, Judge Becker noted that
Skehan did not represent a decision on the merits of the implication question, but was
instead a decision that there was jurisdiction to assert such a claim ....
Concomitantly,
our decision proceeds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and not under 12(b) (1). We do believe that there is jurisdiction to
allege the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. at 393 n. 13 (citations omitted).
33. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). In
Gagliardi, Judge Rosenn concluded that the Third Circuit had not recognized that a fourteenth
amendment cause of action could be asserted against municipal corporations which are not persons within the meaning of § 1983. 564 F.2d at 115 n.3. Furthermore, Judge Rosenn noted that
in Skehan, Rotolo, and McCullough, the only issue decided was "that federal question jurisdiction, as opposed to a federally recognized right lto relief, is created by the mere allegation of
matters in controversy, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id., citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
While concurring in Gagliardi, Judge Gibbons strongly contended that Skehan, Rotolo, and
McCullough had created a fourteenth amendment cause of action against municipal corporations
for civil rights violations. 564 F.2d at 119 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons explained
that
[i]f any of these cases were before us after an order dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1), they could be so read [to apply only to the
jurisdictional issue]. But every one of them was a review of a dismissal on the merits, and
in every one we reversed or affirmed on the merits.
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Patzig v. O'Neil 3 4 by stating that
this Circuit has not yet decided that issue. Skehan holds only that
federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear
constitutional claims against entities (such as municipalities) which
are not persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Skehan does not hold
and is therefore not authority for the proposition that money damages may be recovered from such an entity on a cause of action
implied directly under the fourteenth amendment. This issue of
whether there exists a direct fourteenth amendment cause of action
(as distinct from its jurisdictional predicate) against a municipality
for tort damages has yet to be resolved in this Circuit, and has
35
been expressly left open and reserved for future determination.
B. The Pendent Jurisdiction Approach
After deciding Skehan, McCullough, and Rotolo, the Third Circuit
sanctioned an approach whereby implied fourteenth amendment cases could
be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. 36 Initially, the court relied 37 on
the Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle 38 as support for the proposition that where a nonfrivolous claim based
directly on the fourteenth amendment is asserted against a municipality,
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under section 1331(a). 39 The Third
Circuit then permitted a district court to exercise pendent jurisdiction to
hear a plaintiff's state law claims against that municipality."0
Id. at 118 (Gibbons, J., concurring). After reviewing Skehan, Rotolo, and McCullough in detail,
Judge Gibbons concluded that the Third Circuit had recognized the asserted fourteenth
amendment claim. Id. at 119 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
34. 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 850 (citations omitted).
36. See notes 37-83 and accompanying text infra.
37. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904

(1978).
38. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
39. Id. at 279. In Mt. Healthy, respondent Doyle sued for reinstatement in his former job
with back pay, alleging that his dismissal constituted violations of his first and fourteenth
amendment rights. Id. at 276. He asserted jurisdiction under both § 1343(3) and § 1331(a). Id.
The district court assumed jurisdiction under § 1331(a) and awarded relief. Id. at 277. In response to objections raised by the school board, the Supreme Court held that subject matter
jurisdiction existed under § 1331(a), and that an objection thereto asserting failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted would not defeat the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court. Id. at 279.
40. See notes 41-83 and accompanying telt infra. Pendent jurisdiction provides the authority to litigate in a federal forum claims arising under state law when coupled with a federal
claim arising from a common nucleus of operative fact. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968). The utilization of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction as a means to bring municipalities into federal court is also discussed in Note, supra
note 5, at 435-41. See also note 5 supra.
Furthermore, it is generally maintained that a federal court should always decide the nonconstitutional claims before reaching the constitutional issues. See Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528 (1974) (pendent claim involved a federal statute); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.
R. 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (alternate claim involved state law). Specifically, the Supreme Court has
held that "[g]iven a constitutional question over which the District Court had jurisdiction, it

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss2/7

28

Editors: Federal Practice and Procedure

1978-1979]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

323

This approach was first applied by the Third Circuit in Gagliardi v.
Flint,4 1 wherein the plaintiff sought to hold the City of Philadelphia liable
for the fatal shooting of her son by city policemen. 42 Although the plaintiff
had asserted a claim based upon the fourteenth amendment, 43 the federal
district court found municipal liability under the Pennsylvania Wrongful
Death Act 44 and thus avoided the constitutional issue. 45 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Hagans v. Lavine, 46 the Third Circuit held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in avoiding the fourteenth
amendment claim. 47 Moreover, the Gagliardi court noted that it "may reverse the district court's determination to decide the pendent state law
claims against the city only if the fourteenth amendment claim is so insubstantial that it cannot serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction
under the general federal question statute." 48 Applying the Mt. Healthy
rationale to the present situation, the Third Circuit concluded that although
a substantial argument against implying vicarious liability against
municipalities under the fourteenth amendment could be made, "the ques49
tion remains perplexing and substantial."
Following Gagliardi, the Third Circuit endorsed a similar analysis in
resolving a civil rights damages action against two police officers and the
City of Pittsburgh.50 In Mahone v. Waddle, 5x plaintiffs alleged that the city
was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees under the fourteenth

also had jurisdiction over the 'statutory' claim .... The latter was to be decided first and the
former not reached if the statutory claim was dispositive." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 543
(citations omitted).
41. 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977),. cert. denied, 438 U.S. 312 (1978).
42. 564 F.2d at 113-14. Plaintiff based her claim against the City of Philadelphia on a theory
of respondeat superior. Id. at 114. The doctrine of respondeat superior is derived from tort law,
and holds an employer liable for the acts of his agents committed within the scope of their
employment. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, §§ 69-70, at 458-67. When applied in the fourteenth amendment context of suing municipalities, the theory of respondeat superior is utilized
to hold a municipality liable for the misconduct of its employees when that misconduct is in
furtherance of the employer's purposes rather than purely private in nature. Id. Since deprivations of civil rights are viewed as "constitutional torts," Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57
(1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240,
249 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947), it is possible to borrow the doctrine of
respondeat superior from tort law for utilization in constitutional adjudications. See Hundt,
supra note 6, at 779; Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1352
(1970); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L.
REv. 277 (1965),
For an excellent discussion of the policy reasons behind holding a municipality liable under
the fourteenth amendment on the basis of respondeat superior, see Hundt, supra note 6.
43. 564 F.2d at 114.
44. See 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1601-1604 (Purdon 1953) (current version at 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1978)).
45. 564 F.2d at 114.
46. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See note 40 supra.
47. 564 F.2d at 116.
48. Id.at 114.
49. Id. at 116.
50. See Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978).
51. 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978).
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amendment 52 and section 1981, 53 and that the city was directly liable for
negligently and recklessly training the two individual defendants. 54 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found
that the city was immune from liability under the fourteenth amendment
and section 1981, and dismissed the complaint against the city. 55 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the fourteenth amendment
claim, 56 but stated that the district court may have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the pendent state law claims against the city. 5 7 Moreover,
the Mahone court clarified the Gagliardi rationale by suggesting that the
exercise of pendent subject matter jurisdiction may be inappropriate where
the plaintiff's claim for relief under state law "is not co-extensive with the
58
relief available under the fourteenth amendment."
In a separate opinion, Judge Garth analyzed the fourteenth amendment
issue on a different basis. 59 Relying on Bivens, 60 Judge Garth suggested
that the Third Circuit expressly reject on its merits an implied cause of
action against municipalities under the fourteenth amendment. 6 1 Judge
Garth further argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine

52. 564 F.2d at 1021.
53. Id.
54. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the City of Pittsburgh was directly liable "for
its alleged negligence or wanton recklessness in failing to train and supervise the two individual
defendants and in permitting them to act as police officers notwithstanding the City's prior
knowledge of their propensity to harass and mistreat black citizens." Id.
55. Id. The district court dismissed the federal claims against the city pursuant to rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 564 F.2d at 1021. In the absence of jurisdiction based
upon federal law, the district court was unwilling to exercise its derivative, pendent jurisdiction
over the state law claims, and consequently dismissed those claims as well. Id. The district
court's rationale was that the municipal immunity available under § 1983 extended to claims
brought under the fourteenth amendment and to those based upon § 1981. Id..
56. 564 F.2d at 1037. Since the Mahone court granted relief under § 1981, it expressly
declined to join the debate concerning the fourteenth amendment Bivens remedy. Id. at 1024.
The court of appeals based its holding on the fact that "specific fourteenth amendment violations
alleged in the instant case are racial in character and as such, are fully actionable under section
1981." Id. at 1025 n.8.
57. Id. at 1026.
58. Id. In a separate opinion, Judge Garth implied that the relief available under the state
law claims in Mahone was not coextensive with the relief available under the federal claims
when he stated that an adjudication of the claims would not be "dispositive," and therefore
argued that the majority incorrectly applied Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 564 F.2d at
1055 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See notes 65 & 82 and accompanying
text infra.
59. 564 F.2d at 1037 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. For a discussion of Bivens, see notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
61. 564 F.2d at 1052 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically,
Judge Garth suggested that if the court implied a fourteenth amendment cause of action for
damages, it would be legislating. Id. at 1061 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Other factors influencing Judge Garth's decision to not create a fourteenth amendment
claim included the strength of congressional intent in enacting § 1983 as determined by the
Supreme Court, the absence of congressional action to include municipalities under § 1983 after
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and the less than compelling need to have such a remedy
in view of individual liability under §§ 1981 and 1983. 564 F.2d at 1059-61 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Workers v. Gibbs,6 2 mandated that the pendent state claims be dismissed. 63 Quoting from Gibbs, Judge Garth observed that "It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right . . . [and] ... [i]f the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state
64
claims should be dismissed as well."
65
In Pitrone v. Mercadante, the Third Circuit substantiated the
rationale of Gagliardi in approving the district court's discretionary consideration of the pendent state law claims while refusing to rule on the merits of
the fourteenth amendment claim.6 6 District Judge Ditter had ruled that a
fourteenth amendment claim could not be implied,6 7 and thus felt precluded
by the Supreme Court's decision in Aldinger v. Howard 68 from exercising
jurisdiction over the state law issues. 69 The Third Circuit, however, observed that the Aldinger Court held "only that a city may noebe joined as a
pendent party to an action when there is no independent source of federal
jurisdiction over" 70 the party, whereas the fourteenth amendment issue in
Pitrone created federal subject matter jurisdiction. 71 Pursuant to the holding in Gagliardi, the Pitrone court remanded and instructed the district
2
court to exercise its discretion and hear the pendent state law claims.7
62. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Specifically, the Court stated that "[n]eedless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." Id. at 726.
63. 564 F.2d at 1061 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. 564 F.2d at 1061 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
65. 572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 99 (1978). Unlike the plaintiffs in Mahone, whose state law claims were grounded in negligence, the plaintiff in Pitrone
asserted the township's liability for assault and battery by several police officers on the basis of
respondeat superior. Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The
plaintiffs also asserted state law claims sounding in negligence for the failure of the township to
establish and enforce guidelines for the use of deadly force by police officers. Id. In terms of
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the determination of respondeat superior liability of the
municipality for the assault and battery of plaintiff would thus be "dispositive" of the plaintiff's
cause of action because the elements of proof and damages sought under state law would be
coextensive with the relief available under the Constitution. See note 40 supra.
66. 572 F.2d at 100.
67. 420 F. Supp. at 1391.
68. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the plaintiff asserted a federal cause of action based on
§ 1983 against a county and certain individual defendants, alleging federal jurisdiction under
§ 1343(3). Id. at 3-4. The lower court rejected the § 1983 claim against the county based on prior
Supreme Court decisions which had precluded suits against municipalities under § 1983. Id. at
5. Plaintiff argued alternately that the county could be joined as a pendent party on state law
claims which arose from the same facts as those underlying the federal cause of action against
the the individual defendants. Id. at 4-5. Because those federal claims against the individual
defendants also rested on § 1983, the Supreme Court held that the congressional policy implicit
in that statute to create municipal immunity prevented the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over
the county since no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the municipality existed. Id.
at 17-19.
69. 420 F. Supp. at 1391.
70. 572 F.2d at 100, quoting Gagliardi v. Flint; 564 F.2d 112, 115 n.2, cert. denied, 438
U.S. 904 (1978).
71. 572 F.2d at 100. See note 68 supra.
72. In a concurring opinion, Judge Gibbons considered the exercise of pendent subject matter jurisdiction to be a reasonable accommodation between state and federal law. Id. at 102
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The Third Circuit's most recent opportunity to discuss the implications
of Gagliardi occurred in Patzig v. O'Neil, 73 in which the court acknowledged
the propriety of extending federal jurisdiction to state law claims. 74 In Patzig, plaintiffs sought recovery from the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia
Police Commissioner, and various police officers, 75 alleging that their misconduct resulted in the death of the plaintiffs' daughter. 76 The district court
granted a directed verdict on all claims against plaintiffs. 77 While affirming
this directed verdict in part 78 and refusing to consider the merits of an implied fourteenth amendment cause of action, 79 the Third Circuit nevertheless applied the Gagliardi rationale to consider the state claims.80 The Patzig court stated:
In this case sub judice, the district court, which correctly decided
that the City was subject to its jurisdiction under § 1331, was faced
with several state law claims against the City, as well as the constitutional claims. Under Gagliardi the court had the discretion to
entertain those state claims. Yet the district court, as far as we can
tell from the record, never addressed the pendent claims-i.e. it
never exercised its discretion under Gagliardi. Accordingly, we
must remand to the district court in order that it may consider the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction with regard to the state law claims
before deciding the federal constitutional issue.81

(Gibbons, J., concurring). To support this conclusion, Judge Gibbons noted that in both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, municipal corporations were liable under state law for the torts
committed by their agents. Id. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d
877 (1973); Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968). Moeover, Judge Gibbons
noted that Delaware was approaching a similar result. 572 F.2d at 101 (Gibbons, J., concurring). See City of Wilmington v. Spencer, No. 7?-221, slip op. at 6 (Del. Sup. Ct., filed July 25,.
1978); Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d 429 (Del. 1976).
73. 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
74. Id. at 850-51.
75. Id. at 845.
76. Id. at 845-46. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of their daughter, who hanged herself while in
confinement after the arrest for drunken driving. Id. at 845. Plaintiffs contended that their
daughter was arrested without probable cause in violation of her fourth amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure, that subsequent delay before their daughter appeared before a
magistrate violated due process, and that the treatment their daughter received while in custody constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 1d. at 845-46. In addition, plaintiffs asserted
state law claims based on false arrest and negligence. Id. at 846.
77. Id. at 846.
78. Id. at 846-49. Specifically, the Patzig court found that the district court did not err in
granting a directed verdict against plaintiffs on the issues of due process and cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 846. With regard to the state law false arrest claim, however, the court of
appeals reversed the directed verdict against the plaintiff because "the evidence, taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would sufficiently support the inference that Patzig did not
appear intoxicated when arrested." Id. at 848-49.
79. Id. at 850.
80. Id. at 850-51.
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Additionally, the Patzig court reaffirmed the position adopted in
Mahone that a substantive decision concerning the fourteenth amendment
issue may be necessary where the relief available under state law is not
coextensive with the relief available under the fourteenth amendment.8 2 In

82. Id. at 851 n.ll. Specifically, the Patzig court noted:
In both Pitro'ne and Mahone the relief available under state law was co-extensive with
that sought under the fourteenth amendment. In this case as well the relief is coextensive-both as to elements of proof and elements of damages-since the plaintiffs
alleged a state law false arrest claim as well as a constitutional false arrest claim. (The
elements of each are for the most part the same. Both would support punitive damages.)
In Mahone we recognized that "a case may arise in which a plaintiff claims the relief
available under state law is not co-extensive with the relief available under the fourteenth
amendment." . .. This is not such a case either. Had the plaintiff not asserted the state
false arrest claim, however, we would have been faced with a very different case, a case
in which the relief sought under state law (negligence) would not have been co-extensive
with the relief sought under the fourteenth amendment (unconstitutional arrest), either as
to elements of proof or elements of damages. In such a situation we may well be required
to reach the fourteenth amendment question. . . . We do not decide that question here,
however.
Id. (citations omitted).
A case illustrative of a factual situation in which the Third Circuit might very well be
required to reach the merits of the fourteenth amendment action is Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 451 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1978). In Hayes, the plaintiff was a municipal fireman who
was suspended without pay for allegedly violating three of the Bureau of Fire rules. Id. at 700.
The suspension lasted approximately "four and one-half months, and ended immediately after a
departmental board held a hearing on the three charges and found Hayes guilty of all of them."
Id. "In accordance with the Trial Board's recommendation, Hayes received a sanction of one
thousand hours of penalty time and five years of probation." Id. at 700. Hayes then asserted
claims for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against the City of Wilmington under
the fourteenth amendment, claiming that the defendant effected his suspension in violation of
his constitutional right to procedural due process, that one of the rules he violated was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the penalties imposed upon him violated his rights
under federal and state law. Id. With respect to the claims against the city, Chief Judge
Latchum noted that the recent approach sanctioned by the Third Circuit was to "reaffirm the
long-standing preference for deciding cases on state law grounds and avoiding unnecessary issues of constitutional law, whenever possible." Id. at 704. The Chief Judge then noted that
whether a fourteenth amendment issue could be avoided on the facts of Hayes depended "on
whether the relief available under the pendent state law claims is co-extensive with that available under the Constitution." Id. After discussing this qualification as announced in Mahone and
Patzig, Judge Latchum concluded:
The instant case does present a situation in which the relief available under the state law
claims is not co-extensive with the relief sought under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
state law claims are based on an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement and
an alleged violation of the Delaware Minimum Wage Law. The elements of proof on the
federal and state claims differ significantly. The elements of damages also differ. For
example, only the federal claims provide a remedy for the injury plaintiff allegedly sustained as a result of his four-and-one-half-month suspension without pay. Therefore, this
Court must determine whether a direct cause of action exists under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 704-05.
Chief Judge Latchum then decided that the fourteenth amendment did not give rise to a
cause of action for damages against the municipality, and granted summary judgment in favor of
the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities on the fourteenth amendment
damage claims. Id. at 705.
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Patzig, however, such a determination was unnecessary since the remedies
available under state law and the fourteenth amendment were considered
83
coextensive.
III. PosT-Monell VIABILITY
In light of Monell's holding that municipalities are now "persons" suable
under section 1983,84 two questions arise: 1) whether there is continued
vitality to the fourteenth amendment cause of action against municipalities;
and 2) whether the Third Circuit's pendent jurisdiction approach to circumventing the pre-Monell proscription against suing municipalities under section 1983 remains viable.
It is submitted that the Monell decision may have impliedly substantiated the viability of the fourteenth amendment issue since the only discussion in Monell of the fourteenth amendment cause of action occurred in
Justice Powell's concurrence, in which he argued that such a claim could not
be maintained against local governments.8 5 The majority in Monell ruled
only that governmental liability under section 1983 could not be based on
the principle of respondeat superior 86 but must depend on "execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those

83. 577 F.2d at 851 n.1l.
84. See notes 1-4 and'accompanying text supra. But see Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d
Cir.), vacated sub nom. West Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (1978), on remand, (Second
Circuit) (Jan. 30, 1979). In Turpin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a municipality could be sued under the fourteenth amendment. "This governmental
culpability arises whenever the unconstitutional actions of employees are authorized,
sanctioned, or ratified by municipal officials or bodies functioning at a policy making level." 579
F.2d at 168. The Second Circuit, however, expressly stated that respondeat superior liability
under the fourteenth amendment could not be imposed upon the municipality. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's opinion and directed that court to reconsider its
opinion in light of Monell. 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 27, 1978). On remand, the Second Circuit
held:
While the Monell decision does not call into question the central thesis that federal
courts have the power and the obligation under the general federal question jurisdiction
to create' remedies to redress constitutional grievances, an important element in this
court's previous decision to imply a damages remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment
was that Congress had not supplied a vehicle by which the right in question could be
vindicated.
Monell held that Section 1983 suits may be brought against municipalities under
conditions essentially coextensive with those imposed by this court on the private right of
action enunciated in the earlier opinion. Thus, under the very rationale of that previous
opinion, there is no place for a cause of action against a municipality directly under the
Fourteenth Amendment, because the plaintiff may proceed against the city under section
1983.
(Second Circuit) (January 30, 1979).
Despite the Supreme Court's vacation of the Second Circuit's recognition of an implied
fourteenth amendment cause of action, it is submitted that this action was not a statement by
the Court that a fourteenth amendment cause of action could not be implied. Rather, the Court
suggested that under the facts of Turpin and the subsequent decision in Monell, a statutory
ground for relief might be available. 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 27, 1978).
85. 436 U.S. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 690-95.
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whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy."8s7 Clearly
many complaints filed in the Third Circuit alleging municipal liability could
not comply with this requirement for establishing section 1983 liability
against a local governmental unit.88
Since the pre-Monell municipal exemption from liability under section
1983 did not foreclose the implication of a cause of action under the fourteenth amendment,8 9 it would be inconsistent to interpret Monell as prohibiting fourteenth amendment suits solely because section 1983 does not
permit vicarious liability. Nevertheless, in light of the reasoning which supported the pre-Monell cause of action under the fourteenth amendment, 90
any debate concerning municipal vicarious liability will probably focus on the
propriety of imposing respondeat superior liability on local governments. 9 1
Since Monell expressly held that a municipality cannot be liable on the basis
of respondeat superior under section 1983, many federal courts may be re92
luctant to impose this liability under the fourteenth amendment.
87. Id. at 694.
88. See notes 41-42, 50-51 & 65 and accompanying text supra. In addition, the burden of
proving an official custom may be rigorous. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (Supreme
Court established requirement of adoption, encouragement, or implementation of a deliberate
policy to find an official custom concerning "police brutality").
89. See notes 17 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 6 & 12-17 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id. For a more thorough discussion of this point by another commentator, see Note,
supra note 5. Further illustrative of this opinion is Chief Judge Lord's opinion in Santiago v.
City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Santiago, Chief Judge Lord stated
that a cause of action under the fourtenth amendment on the basis or respondeat superior
should be upheld even if such vicarious liability would not support a section 1983 action against
a municipality:
We also conclude that even if respondeat superior were held inapplicable in a § 1983
claim, such a holding would not dictate a similar conclusion in an action pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment .... Section 1983 is a statutory right and its interpretation does
not control the boundaries of a judicially created constitutional remedy.
Id. at 149 n.4. See also note 17 and accompanying text supra. Although Santiago was a preMonell decision, the policy arguments advanced favoring respondeat superior liability under the
fourteenth amendment upon which Judge Lord relied are still viable support for the implication
remedy. The Court in Monell recognized the justifications for respondeat superior but concluded that such could not be applied under § 1983, the statutory remedy, because of congressional intent to preclude such liability under the statute. 436 U.S. at 692-94.
The fact that Congress intended to preclude liability under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior does not a fortiori preclude the possibility of such liability under the Constitution.
However, using Justice Harlan's "necessary or appropriate" standard as well as Justice Brennan's "special factors counselling hesitation," See 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring), a
strong argument can be made that Congress has preempted the fourteenth amendment area in
terms of municipal liability for unconstitutional conduct, and that since plaintiffs have both state
and federal claims against the individual violators of their constitutional rights, there is no need
for a court to engage in a Bivens type of judicial legislation. See notes 10, 17 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
92. See generally, Note, supra note 5, at 438. See also Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F.
Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In Kedra, plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally arrested and
beaten by police officers as well as subjected to illegal searches. Id. at 658-59. They brought an
action under § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment against the police officers, their superiors,
and the City of Philadelphia for violations of their civil rights. Id. at 659-60. Judge Luongo,
noting that Monell was decided after the parties had submitted their briefs, construed the issue
before him in light of Monell:

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7
330

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 314

Moreover, if a fourteenth amendment action on the basis of respondeat
superior continues to be considered a substantial federal question after
Monell, 93 then the pendent state claim approach of Gagliardi, Mahone, Pitrone, and Patzig should remain a viable alternative through which a substantive decision concerning the fourteenth amendment issue can be
avoided.94 While in each of those four cases plaintiffs alleged substantive
constitutional claims against local governments, the Third Circuit avoided the
merits of the fourteenth amendment claims by first resolving the pendent
state law issues. 9a Since the Third Circuit was reluctant to decide the fourteenth amendment issue before Monell, it is submitted that the Third Circuit will be equally reluctant to decide this issue on the merits in light of
Monell.
Finally, the Monell decision presents new problems for the pendent
jurisdiction approach developed by the Third Circuit in Gagliardi and its
progeny. In particular, Monell may effect the concern expressed by Judge

The question, then, is whether plaintiffs allegations against the City contain the
"touchstone" identified by the Court: 'an allegation that official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of rights.' A survey of the complaint discloses nothing approaching such an
allegation. Rather, the complaint makes clear, and plaintiffs' brief confirms, that the only
theory asserted against the City is respondeat superior, the theory specifically foreclosed
by Monell. I therefore hold that plaintiffs may not maintain an action against the City of
Philadelphia under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Id. at 677.
Furthermore, Judge Luongo emphatically rejected the validity of an implied fourteenth
amendment cause of action against a municipal corporation. Id. at 677-79. In so doing, Judge
Luongo adopted an approach similar to the analysis he utilized in Jones v. McElroy°429 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D, Pa. 1977) in arriving at the same conclusion. Id. at 856-60. In addition, Judge
Luongo refused to exercise his discretion to hear the pendent state claims presented by the
plaintiffs against the City of Philadelphia. 454 F. Supp. at 682. In explaining his reasoning,
Judge Luongo stated that
the primary reason for rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment theory is that it circumvents the civil rights enforcement scheme established by Congress, which prohibits federal litigation of this type of respondeat superior claim against municipalities. Allowance
of federal litigation of these state law claims against the City would have the same result;
it would negate the Supreme Court's recent judgment that "Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort."
Id. at 683 (citations omitted).
93. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
94. Cf. Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 682 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (a post-Monell
complaint dismissed under § 1983 because pleadings failed to allege official municipal policy or
custom was responsible for the deprivation of civil rights; the district court also refused to
consider a fourteenth amendment claim against the city because to do so would circumvent
congressional intent as interpreted in Monell to hold a municipality immune tinder § 1983 from
respondeat superior liability; the district of court then refused to consider the state pendent
claims because allowance of these claims would equally circumvent congressional intent by allowing a municipality to be sued on the basis of respondeat superior in federal court). See note
92 supra.
95. See Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 572 F.2d 98
(3d Cir.) (per curiam) cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 99 (1978); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 312 (1978); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 312 (1978).
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Garth that a federal court may never reach an implied fourteenth amendment issue when it has the option of deciding only the pendent state law
claims:
If such a claim were always joined with a related state law
claim-e.g., a state tort claim-the federal claim could be used
again and again for the sole purpose of creating otherwise nonexistent federal jurisdiction. Under the majority's interpretation of
96
Hagans, the validity of the federal claim might never be reached.
This issue may never be resolved, however, in view of Judge Luongo's interpretation of Monell in Kedra v. City of Philadelphia,97 wherein he noted
that the exercise of penident subject matter jurisdiction over state claims
circumvents congressional intent in enacting section 1983 to grant
municipalities immunity from suits based on theories of respondeat
superior.98 If this interpretation is adopted by other federal courts, the ability of litigants to use pendent subject matter jurisdiction to bring an action
in federal court may be lost.
In addition, the Monell decision did not define the elements of governmental "custom" for purposes of establishing municipal liability under
section 1983. The inability of the Monell Court to adequately define the
requirement of governmental custom is reflected in the Kedra decision, in
which Judge Luongo reviewed the plaintiffs' complaint and ruled that it
could not support an action under section 1983. 99 If this ambiguity is not
resolved, the utility of the Monell ruling may be substantially diminished
since many plaintiffs may want to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment on
the pleadings by failing to adequately allege a governmental custom. 10 0
Without an articulation by the Supreme Court as to the meaning of "custom," plaintiffs might rely on an implied fourteenth amendment claim
against the municipality and seek federal subject matter jurisdiction over
pendent state claims.
In the final analysis, the practical effect of Monell is to foster uncertainty. If a plaintiff asserts section 1983 liability by alleging that his injury
was the result of a municipal custom or policy, he risks judgment on the
pleadings as in Kedra. 101 If, in an attempt to avoid this, he seeks federal
jurisdiction by asserting a fourteenth amendment claim, and then appends
his state law claims thereto, he relies not only on the individual judge's
determinations about the propriety of the fourteenth amendment remedy

96. 564 F.2d at 1055 n.33.
97. 454 F. Supp. 652, 679-83 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also note 92 supra.
98. 454 F. Supp. at 683.
99. Id. at 677.
100. See note 88 supra. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Rizzo, the United
States Supreme Court refused to impose any liability upon city officials for alleged claims of
police brutality in the absence of evidence that these supervisory officials had adopted, encouraged, or implemented a deliberate policy which violated the respondent's civil rights. Id. at
368, 373-77.
101. See note 92 supra.
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but also on that judge's discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction.1 2 If a
government agent acts pursuant to official regulations or ordinances, section
1983 liability is clear.' 0 3 Conversely, where the unauthorized acts of a government agent are the subject of litigation, it is equally clear that no section
1983 liability attaches.' 0 4 The more difficult cases are the recurring police
brutality cases prevalent in the Third Circuit, for it is questionable whether
frequent litigation over this issue establishes a custom. 10 5
It is thus submitted that pleading games are encouraged by these uncertainties. Until the Supreme Court definitively approves or rejects respondeat
superior liability of municipalities under the fourteenth amendment, there
can be no answers for counsel seeking to reach the "'deep pocket" municipality through federal suits.
John W. Van Cott
102.
103.
104.
105.

See
See
See
See

notes
notes
notes
notes

59-64, 82 & 92 supra.
2-4 and accompanying text supra.
2-4 and accompanying text supra.
88 & 100 supra.
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FEDERAL ABSTENTIONABSTENTION BY FEDERAL COURTS WHEN REQUESTED TO ENJOIN
STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IS PROPER ONLY WHERE THE STATE IS A
PARTY OR WHERE THE STATE CIVIL PROCEEDING IS A CIVIL CONTEMPT ACTION.

Johnson v. Kelly (1978)
Pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute directing a tax sale for nonpayment
of local property taxes, 1 defendants purchased property located in Delaware
County, Pennsylvania, which was owned Sy the named plaintiffs. 2 Following this sale, the defendants instituted proceedings to quiet title. 3 While
this state action was pending, 4 the plaintiffs brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania tax sale statute. 5 The district court
dismissed this action 6 pursuant to the doctrine of abstention developed by
the United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris7 and subsequent
cases. 8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9 reversed, holding that the Younger doctrine is applicable only when
the state initiated the state civil proceedings or when the state civil proceeding is a civil contempt action. Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir.
1978).

1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §

5

971(g) (Purdon 1968).

2. Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978). The named defendants were
Grace Building Company, Inc., Curtis Building Company, Inc., and E. Jack Ippoliti,
Prothonotary of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Id. Defendant Ippoliti was substituted for Robert F. Kelly, who occupied the office of prothonotary at the time the complaint
was filed. Id.
3. Id. Two of these proceedings, those of named plaintiffs Doris E. Johnson and Joseph
Massey were pending in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas at the time the federal
action was filed. Id. n.1. A third action, instituted by Joseph and Mary Tunstall, had twice been
decided favorably to the plaintiffs, and twice been reversed by the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania. See Curtis Bldg. Co. v. Tunstall, 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 233, 387 A.2d 1370 (1978).
4. 583 F.2d at 1244 n.1. The Tunstalls' appeal of the adverse decision in commonwealth
court was pending in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id.
5. Id. at 1244-45.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the state statute violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment "by failing to require a judicial determination of the accuracy of an
alleged tax delinquency prior to the County's conducting a tax sale, and by failing to require
notice by personal service to a property owner whose land is scheduled to be sold for taxes." Id.
at 1245. In addition, plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing the tax sale purchasers from commencing or continuing with the state actions to quiet title and preventing the Delaware County
prothonotary from filing these actions. Id. Finally, plaintiffs requested a district court order
requiring that the tax sales of the properties of the plaintiffs who pay to the county treasurer all
taxes due and related costs be set aside. Id.
6. Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The district court opinion was
written by Judge Ditter.
7. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
9. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Rosenn and Aldisert. Chief Judge
Seitz wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Aldisert wrote the dissenting opinion.

(333)
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The United States Supreme Court first permitted federal courts to abstain from exercising federal equity jurisdiction where a state proceeding was
pending in order to "avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the
friction of a premature constitutional decision." 10 In Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co., " the Supreme Court maintained that "federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the
smooth working of the judiciary," 12 and explained that "[tihe reign of law is
hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court." 13 This abstention
doctrine, however, did not deny the complainant access to the federal court
where available state proceedings could not adequately protect the constitutional claims presented. 14 Moreover, continued abstention by federal courts
10. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1940).
11. 312 U.S. 496 (1940). In Pullman, a railroad company and its porters attacked a Texas
state commission regulation requiring Pullman cars to be in the charge of an employee with the
rank of conductor at all times. Id. at 498. Many trains had but one Pullman car, in the charge of
black porters subject to the control of a white conductor. Id. at 497-98. The plaintiffs sued in
federal court, alleging the unconstitutionality of the state regulation. Id. at 498-99.
This early abstention doctrine has been categorized by one commentator in the following
manner:
Abstention allows a federal court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked to
postpone decision, pending trial in a state court, when the result might turn on issues of
state law. The resulting procedures can be quite complex. The federal court neither decides the state-law questions nor dismisses the complaint in the exercise of its "equitable"
discretion. It denies immediate relief but retains jurisdiction, sending the parties to state
courts to obtain a decision on the state-law issues, usually in a declaratory judgment
action. Since 1964 the moving party has in theory had the right to return to the federal
district court for resolution of the federal questions if he properly reserved his right to do
so; res judicata will then not bar relitigation of the federal issues even if the state court
has decided them.
Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: Justice Frankfurter'sDoctrine In An Activist Era, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 604, 604-05 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
12. 312 U.S. at 501, citing DeGiovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935);
Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919).
One commentator has criticized the use of the Pullman doctrine in the federal courts. See
Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977). Specifically, Field has
pointed out:
The delay and expense inherent in the abstention procedure are legendary, and have
caused some judges and commentators to bemoan the doctrine from the outset. Those
qualities are exacerbated, however, by three less often noted problems with Pullman
abstention, which I wish to point out here. The first relates to the reviewability of abstention decisions; the second involves the misuse of the abstention procedure to accomplish
purposes other than the clarification of state law; the third concerns the possibility that
abstention in a particular case will not result in any state supreme court pronouncement
on the controverted state law question. I conclude that the abstention procedure is not
worth its costs; if state court clarification of the issues is deemed necessary, certification of
the issues directly to the state supreme court is a preferable device.
Id. at 591-92 (footnote omitted).
13. 312 U.S. at 500. The Pullman abstention doctrine has generally been interpreted as
limited to situations in which a state decision could obviate the need for federal constitutional
interpretation. See Field, supra note 12, at 590.
14. 312 U.S. at 501. The majority in Pullman noted that on the facts presented, the litigants
had an adequate remedy in state court because Texas law furnished the means by which the
scope of a state commission's authority could be determined and provided review of administrative orders. Id. The construction of state law by the state court may therefore have obviated the
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was considered inappropriate where the state court decision to which the
federal court had deferred proved inconclusive on the constitutional
claims. 15
Following the Pullman decision, the Supreme Court extended the
abstention doctrine to encompass state criminal proceedings. In Younger v.
Harris,16 the Supreme Court reversed a federal district court injunction of a
state criminal proceeding 17 because such action was a violation of national
policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state criminal proceedings except under special circumstances.' 8 In addition to this tradi19
tional rationale for restraining the exercise of federal equity powers, the
20
The
Younger Court based its decision upon the principles of comity.
necessity of deciding the federal constitutional issue. Id. Although the existence of these state
remedies did not preclude access to federal courts, the burden was upon the federal plaintiff to
show that the state remedy did not protect his constitutional rights. Id. The majority noted: "In
the absence of any showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive ruling in the
state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of the constitutional claim, the district court
should exercise its wise discretion by staying its hand." Id. Later cases have interpreted this
passage to require, inter alia, a showing of bad faith or harassment by state courts. For a
discussion of these cases, see note 21 and accompanying text infra.
15. 312 U.S. at 501. Since Pullman abstention amounts to a stay of a federal court's equity
powers, rather than a denial of its jurisdiction, such jurisdiction may be renewed if the state
court construction fails to remove the federal constitutional question. See, e.g., England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
16. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the defendant was indicted under a California criminal
syndicalism statute: Id. at 38. he then brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaration
that the statute was unconstitutional on its face in that it deprived him of his first amnendment
freedoms. Id. at 38-39. He also requested an order enjoining the Los Angeles County prosecutor from prosecuting him under the statute. Id. at 39.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id. at 43. Justice Black, in his opinion in Younger, explained the reluctance of federal
courts to interfere with pending criminal proceedings in the following manner:
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary
sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that
courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. The doctrine may have grown out of circumstances peculiar to the English judicial system and not applicable in this country, but
its fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits is equally
important under our Constitution, in order to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and
avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would be
adequate to protect the rights asserted.
Id. at 43-44.
19. The majority in Younger noted that this longstanding policy has, since the beginnings of
the nation, resulted in Congress "manifest[ing] a desire to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts." Id. at 43. In 1793 the predecessor to what is now the
Anti-Injunction Act was enacted. See Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335. The present
statute has not changed substantially. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The Act provides that "[a]
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
20. 401 U.S. at 44. According to Justice Black, the
underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made
up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 333

Younger Court did recognize, however, that the exercise of federal equity
jurisdiction might be proper where a threat to the claimant's federally protected rights could not be eliminated by his defense in a single prosecution. 21
In Hicks v. Miranda,22 the Supreme Court expanded the Younger
rationale to a situation in which the indictment of a criminal defendant in
state court occurred shortly after the defendant had initiated a suit in federal
district court seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment regarding a
state statute's constitutionality. 23 The Hicks Court dismissed the federal
suit, stating that Younger applied "where state criminal proceedings are
begun against the federal plaintiffs after the complaint is filed but before any
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court." 24
The Supreme Court, however, has been hesitant to extend the Younger
rationale to all cases involving state civil proceedings. In Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.,25 the Court noted that the comity and federalism aspects of Younger
were applicable to a civil case which was "closely akin" to a criminal prosecution. 26 The Younger interpretation of comity was also utilized by'the
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one
familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism."
Id.
21. Id. at 46. Furthermore, the Younger majority noted the importance of the Court's decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), which had expressed the power of a federal
court to intervene in a state criminal proceeding. 401 U.S. at 47-48. In Dombrowski, the Court
maintained that where the federal complaint alleges that prosecutions are not "made with any
expectation of securing valid convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes" to harass appellants, federal intervention is warranted. 380 U.S. at 482. The majority in Younger noted that, notwithstanding
broad dicta in Dombrowski, the facts in Dombrowski brought the case within the exception to
the abstention doctrine, and as such, the cases were consistent. 401 U.S. at 50.
In addition, the Younger Court noted that federal intervention may be warranted where a
state statute was "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause." Id. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941). For further discussion
of the Younger decision, see Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of
Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1972); Note,
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 301 (1971); Note, Federal Injunctions
Against State Prosecutions Reconsidered, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 506 (1971).
22. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
23. The state court defendant in. Hicks was the owner of a movie theater from which the
police had seized four copies of an allegedly obscene film. Id. at 334 & 335 n.2. At the time of
the state court indictment, no pretrial motions had been granted or hearings held in the federal
case. Id. at 338-39.
24. Id. at 349. Accordingly, the Hicks decision was designed to obviate the problem created
by federal plaintiffs in avoiding the Younger doctrine by "racing" to the courthouse. Id. Justice
Stewart noted, however, that the race still existed, but it was now fixed in favor of the states
since they could "leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first at the finish line."
Id. at 354 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Note, 21 VILL. L. REV. 317 (1976). After Hicks, a
prosecution would be considered pending even if the charges were filed after the federal suit
was filed, so long as no substantial proceedings on the merits had taken place in federal court.
422 U.S. at 349.
25. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
26. Id. at 604. In Huffman, the lessee of a theater, which had been closed by state officials
under an Ohio nuisance statute for showing obscene films, brought suit in federal court to
enjoin the enforcement of the closure order. Id. at 598. The Court noted that, in addition to the
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Supreme Court in Juidice v. Vail 27 to restrain a federal court from exercising jurisdiction under section 1983.28 In recognizing the importance of comity, 29 the Juidice Court emphasized that the state has significant interests in
certain civil matters, and the preservation of the integrity of these interests
mandated that the pending state proceeding not be enjoined by a federal
court.

30

nuisance procedures being quasi-criminal in nature, the comity and federalism aspects of
Younger were equally applicable to civil as well as criminal cases. Id. at 604. Another aspect of
Huffman extended the definition of "pending state proceeding" to cover state appellate review.
Id. at 609. The Court stated: "Federal post-trial intervention, in a fashion designed to annul the
results of a state trial, also deprives the State of a function which quite legitimately is left to
them, that of overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues which arise in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction." Id. After Huffman, federal intervention is improper
until a litigant has exhausted his state appellate remedies. Id. For a discussion of the exhaustion
requirement, see note 74 infra.
Following the Huffman decision, the Supreme Court noted the scope of the abstention
doctrine. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1975).
Particularly, the Colorado River Court indicated three areas where federal abstention would be
proper:
(a) Abstention is appropriate "in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which
might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of
pertinent state law." ...
(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar .
(c) Finally, abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, . . . state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene
films, . . . or collection of state taxes.

Id. at 814-16 (citations omitted).
27. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
28. Id. at 329-30. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). At the time Younger was decided, a question existed as to whether
injunctive relief under § 1983 of a pending state proceeding was barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). For the text of § 2283, see note 19 supra.
In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1975), the Supreme Court resolved this question by
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not constitute a bar to a § 1983 action. Id. at 229.
Furthermore, the Mitchum Court recognized that § 1983, as well as other congressional enactments, including removal statutes, habeas corpus proceedings, and federal interpleader, were
express exceptions to the restrictions created by the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 234-35.
29. 430 U.S. at 334.
30. Id. at 335. The Juidice court stated:
A State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that system affords the opportunity to pursue federal
claims within it, is surely an important interest. Perhaps it is not quite as important as is
the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws, Younger, supra, or even its
interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in
Huffman, supra. But we think itisof sufficiently great import as to require application of
the principles of those cases. The contempt power lies at the core of the administration of
a State's judicial system.
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In its most recent consideration of the boundaries of the Younger doctrine, the Supreme Court once again applied Younger to bar a federal court
from enjoining a state civil proceeding. 31 In Trainor v. Hernandez,3 2 the
Court viewed a state initiated civil eforcement action as analogous to a
criminal proceeding, 33 and held that its prior decisions in Younger,
Huffman, and Juidice required abstention under those specific facts. 34 In
applying the Younger rationale to the circumstances presented in Trainor,
the Supreme Court, consistent with its prior decisions in Huffman and
Juidice, noted that certain factors were crucial to the decision, 35 and expressed its reluctance to extend the Younger approach to state civil pro36
ceedings generally.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether the
Younger doctrine is generally applicable to restrain federal courts from enjoining state civil proceedings, several lower federal courts have addressed
that issue. In Ealy v. Littlejohn,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Younger and its progeny did not preclude federal injunctive relief in a state civil proceeding where such relief did not
threaten proper federal-state relations and was necessary to protect constitu-

31. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977).
32. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
33. Id. at 444-46 & n.8. The federal plaintiffs in Trainor had fraudulently concealed assets
while applying for welfare benefits. Id. at 435. The state, however, rather than prosecute criminally, opted to institute civil proceedings by attaching the property of the appellants for the
purpose of obtaining restitution of the welfare payments made. Id. at 436. Although the state
was a party to the state civil proceeding pending, the statute under which the attachment
proceeding was brought did not give the state exclusive rights to bring such actions. Id. at 439.
Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 595-97 (1974) (nuisance suit, pursuant to which
closure of theater showing obscene movies was obtained, could only be instituted by the state).
34. 431 U.S. at 444. The Trainor Court limited its application of the Younger doctrine to
the facts of this case, rather than extending it to civil cases generally. The Trainor Court held
that "the principles of Younger and Huffman are b oad enough to apply to interference by a
federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its
sovereign capacity." Id. (footnote omitted).
35. Id. In particular, the Trainor Court indicated that the extension of Younger to the
present case was warranted because the plaintiff arguably had an adequate remedy in the pending state proceedings. Id. at 447 n.10. See also Kugler v. Helfunt, 421 U.S. 117 (1975) (state
judicial system allowed disqualification of judge alleged to be involved in harassment plot
against federal plaintiff). Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Trainor had not alleged bad faith,
harassment, or any other reason why the state proceeding would be inadequate relief. 431 U.S.
at 446-47. See also Note, Of Laboratoriesand Liberties: State Court Protection of Polticial and
Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV. 533 (1976). But see Shaman & Turkington, Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.U.L. REV. 907, 923-29 (1976).
36. 431 U.S. at 444-46 & n.8. The Supreme Court has sanctioned abstention in a third
situation-that in which "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar" are present. Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1975).
37. 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978). In Ealy, Mississippi police officers shot a black youth, for
which they were not immediately prosecuted. Id. at 222. After pressure from an association of
black citizens induced a grand jury investigation, those very proceedings were used by state
officials to harass the association by probing its finances and organizational structure, which bore
no relation to the shooting. Id. at 229. Suit was filed in federal court requesting injunctive
relief. Id. at 223-24.
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tional rights. 38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
evaluated the application of the Younger doctrine to civil cases in Marshall
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 39 and maintained that "Younger abstention has
been recently broadened by considerations of comity and federalism to include federal abstention even where the pending state action is civil in nature but where the state has a clear interest." 40 Moreover, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that Younger and its
progeny mandate abstention in both civil and criminal proceedings. In
Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., 41 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the abstention doctrine of Younger applied generally to state civil actions because "[Ii]nterference in state civil proceedings,
like interference in state criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, would preclude state courts 'the opportunity to resolve federal issues arising in (state)
courts,' and would . . . 'be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the
state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles."' 42 Subsequently,
in Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff,43 the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its position in Nottingham Liquors in requiring federal abstention."
The Kiroff
court found that "Younger-Huffman adequately embodies the principles of
equitable restraint in a test which is appropriately applied to assess the wisdom of federal court injunction of state civil, as well as the state criminal
45
proceedings."
Confronted with this confusion concerning the scope of the Younger
doctrine, the Johnson court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Trainor expressly limited the Younger abstention doctrine to litigation in
which the state civil proceeding was initiated by the state itself. 46 In doing
so, the majority distinguished the Supreme Court's utilization of Younger
38. Id. at 234. The Ealy court held that under these facts, exceptional circumstances of bad
faith were shown so as to bring the catse within the exception to the Younger doctrine. Id. at
233. Furthermore, the court stated that the underlying rationale of abstention did not apply,
stating that "[giranting federal injunctive relief here would not reflect negatively on the ability
of state courts to pass on constitutional issues . .. nor jeopardize Mississippi's interest in the
enforcement of its laws and smooth functioning of its judicial process." Id. at 234 (citations
omitted).
39. 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977). In Marshall, the United States Secretary of Labor sued for
injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, alleging that a trustee could not settle an
account in state court with respect to proceeds obtained pursuant to a federal retirement income statute which gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 681-82.
40. Id. at 683-84. The court, however, found abstention inappropriate in this case, holding
that since neither the Secretary nor the State of New York had ever been a party to the state
action for an accounting, the case "does not fall within the ambit of Huffman, Juidice, or
Trainor." Id. at 684.
41. 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976). In Nottingham Liquors, plaintiffs sought federal injunctive
relief from a state court order restraining plaintiffs from mass picketing and mass marching on or
near particular business premises. Id. at 653.
42. Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
43. 549 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977).
44. 549 F.2d at 1056. In Kiroff, a defendant in a state civil action sought to enjoin any
further proceedings in state court and to permanently enjoin the case from being tried therein.
Id. at 1054-55.
45. Id. at 1056-57.
46. 583 F.2d at 1248.
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abstention in Juidice, a case in which the state was technically not a party,47 as
being restricted to the facts of that case. 4 8 Chief Judge Seitz, writing for
the majority, noted that the doctrine of abstention was a limited exception to
49
the obligation of a district court to adjudicate matters properly before it.
More importantly, he stated that if the district court were compelled to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction whenever any state civil action were
pending, a plaintiff seeking relief under section 1983 50 would effectively be
required to exhaust his state judicial remedies. 5 1 According to the Johnson
majority, this result would be entirely inconsistent with principles estab52
lished by the Supreme Court.
Recognizing that the Johnson case provided the Third Circuit with an
opportunity to resolve the evasive question concerning the scope of the
Younger doctrine in civil cases, Judge Aldisert dissented. 53 While noting
47. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). Chief Judge Seitz, in distinguishing the state
court contempt power involved in Juidice from the instant case, stated:
Although technically speaking it is true that the state was not a party to the proceeding enjoined by the district court in Juidice, it is readily apparent that an injunction
against state court judges, preventing them from exercising state-authorized judicial powers vital to the administration of justice, implicates the federalism and comity strand of
the Younger doctrine much more severely than would an injunction here preventing private litigants from pursuing their quiet title actions in state court. In exercising his power
of civil contempt, a state court judge becomes a real party to the proceedings in a unique
way.
583 F.2d at 1249.
48. 583 F.2d at 1249. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
49. 583 F.2d at 1249-50. Relying on Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the Third Circuit noted that "'[tihe doctrine of abstention, under
which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy
properly before it."' 583 F.2d at 1249-50, quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). For a discussion of Colorado River, see note 24 supra.
50. For the text of § 1983, see note 28 supra.
51. 583 F.2d at 1252.
52. Id. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the Supreme Court acknowledged the relationship between § 1983 litigants and the federal court, and maintained that "[ilt
is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. at 183. Subsequently, the Supreme Court noted that the
Younger standard must be met to justify federal intervention in a state proceeding where the
litigant had not exhausted his state appellate remedies. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
609 (1975). It is interesting to note that exhaustion of remedies prior to adjudication in a court
of law has traditionally been imposed only with respect to administrative rather than judicial
remedies. See Shaman & Turkington, supra note 35, at 921. One commentator has stated:
The requirement of exhaustion of remedies was developed in the context of administrative law. Indeed, critics of the no exhaustion policy of section 1983 actions buttress
their argument for the imposition of an exhaustion requirement by analogy to administrative law contexts. This analogy is unconvincing. When the legislature creates an administrative agency, it does not normally envision judicial review of the agency's decisionmaking process until the agency has exercised its function. The basic principle of
administrative law that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review of
agency action puts a premium on the expertise and autonomy of the agency in the
decision-making process.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968).
53. 583 F.2d at 1252 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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that section 1983 is an exception to the congressional limitations imposed by
the Anti-Injunction Act (Act), 54 Judge Aldisert reasoned that the passage of
the Act expressed a congressional policy of noninterference in both criminal
and civil state proceedings. 55 Furthermore, he argued that the principles of
56
equity, comity, and federalism, as developed by the Younger decision,
57
Judge Aldisert therewere equally applicable to state civil proceedings.
fore concluded that to avoid abstention and permit federal injunctive relief,
the appropriate test should
require a federal plaintiff to prove (1) exceptional circumstances
where irreparable injury is both great and immediate, or (2) the
absence of a plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy for the federal wrong, unless there is "proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a
58
valid conviction."
Moreover, Judge Aldisert noted that the post-Younger decisions by the
Supreme Court were consistent with this result. 5 9 He found substantial
support in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Trainor.6 0 Furthermore,
while acknowledging that the Trainor decision may require the existence of
a state interest in order to mandate federal abstention, he noted that "a state
54. Id. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
55. 583 F.2d at 1254-55 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert cited Mitchum v. *Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972), as support for the proposition that to construe § 1983 as an express statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not alter the balance between federal and state
jurisdiction. 583 F.2d at 1255 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See note 28 supra. Specifically, the
Mitchum Court held:
In so concluding [that § 1983 was an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act], we do not
question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must
restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state proceeding. These principles, in the
context of state criminal prosecutions, were canvassed at length last Term in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, and its companion cases. They are principles that have been emphasized by this Court many times in the past.
407 U.S. at 243. If the Younger abstention principles were unaffected by the Mitchum result,
then, according to Judge Aldisert, abstention necessarily remained the rule, not the exception.
583 F.2d at 1255 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
56. See notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra.
57. 583 F.2d at 1258 (Aldisert, J.,dissenting).
58. Id., quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
59. 583 F.2d at 1255 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1256-57 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In Trainor, Justice Stevens explained:
The Court explicitly does not decide "whether Younger principles apply to all civil
litigation." . .. Its holding in this case therefore rests squarely on the fact that the State,
rather than some other litigant, is the creditor that invoked the Illinois attachment procedure. This rationale cannot be tenable unless principles of federalism require greater deference to the State's interest in collecting its own claims than to its interest in providing
a forum for other creditors in the community. It would seem rather obvious to me that
the amount of money involved in any particular dispute is a matter of far less concern to
the sovereign than the integrity of its own procedures. Consequently, the fact that a State
is a party to a pending proceeding should make it less objectionable to have the constitutional issue adjudicated in a federal forum than if only private litigants were involved. I
therefore find it hard to accept the Court's contrary evaluation as a principled application
of the majestic language in Mr. Justice Black's Younger opinion.
431'tU.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
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has a pronounced interest in maintaining the viability and integrity of its
own court system."61 Accordingly, Judge Aldisert maintained that to the extent that a federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction where a
state criminal proceeding is pending, a federal court must also restrain its
62
injunctive powers where a state civil case is pending.
It is submitted that the majority opinion in Johnson was remiss in failing
63
It
to discuss the applicability of Pullman abstention to the case before it.
is irrelevant that counsel did not appeal the district court's determination of
the matter since abstention can be raised by the court sua sponte. 64 As the
district court observed, the County Return Act 6 5 had never been upheld
under direct constitutional attack, 66 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has never ruled on the propriety of the challenged notice provisions. 6 7 It is
suggested that Pullman abstention would have been appropriate since the
high court of Pennsylvania could have construed the statute as impliedly
requiring personal service, thereby removing the constitutional question. 68
Moreover, in disposing of the Younger issue, the majority cited Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States 69 to support the
proposition that abstention was a narrow exception to the necessity of ad-

61. 583 F.2d at 1257 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1258 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
63.. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
64. See Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976). Naylor v. Case and McGrath, Inc.,
585 F.2d 557, 563 (2d Cir. 1978); Brown v. First Nat'l City Bank, 503 F.2d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir.
1974).
65. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
66. 436 F. Supp. at 165. The Johnson district court stated that while several lower Pennsylvania courts had held that the only statutory requirement was that proper notice be given, no
Pennsylvania court had ever upheld the Country Return Act in the face of a direct constitutional
attack. Id.
67. See id. & n.23. The district court noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
been very sympathetic to the due process claims of those facing loss of their property from tax
sales, albeit in other contexts. Id. at 166. See, e.g., March v. Banus, 395 Pa. 629, 151 A.2d 612
(1959); Shafer v. Hansen, 389 Pa. 500, 133 A.2d 538 (1956).
68. See Field, supra note 12, for a discussion of the purpose of the Pullman doctrine. The
district court dismissed the applicability of the Pullman doctrine to the Johnson case primarily
upon t'he Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 436 F.
Supp. at 162. Based upon its facts, however, Constantineau should not be given such controlling weight. In Constantineau, the Supreme Court was confronted with a state statute which
contained no express provisions for hearing and notice. 400 U.S. at 434, 439. In discussing
whether the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction, Justice Douglas noted that
"[w]here there is no ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court should not abstain but
should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim." Id. at 439. Since the statute did not
provide for hearings and notice, Justice Douglas concluded that the federal court could decide
the issue. Id.
In Johnson, however, the Pennsylvania statute did contain express provisions for notice.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 597 1(g) (Purdon 1968). Conceivably, the pertinent provisions of
the statute were consistent with prevailing notions of due process at the time of enactment.
Hence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could have interpreted the legislative intent to
grant the most liberal procedural protections and thereby implied personal service. It is submitted that the instant case, in contrast to Constantineau, could have furnished an opportunity for
the state forum to protect the litigant's constitutional rights.
69. 424 U.S. 800 (1975). See note 26 supra.
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judicating a controversy properly before the federal court. 70 In Colorado
River, however, the Supreme Court enumerated the situations in which
Younger abstention applied, 71 including a case involving the collection of
state taxes. 72 Arguably, therefore, even if Colorado River allows only a narrow exception to the obligation of federal courts to adjudicate matters prop73
erly before them, that exception may have been present in Johnson.
Furthermore, the majority's argument that the practical effect of extending Younger to civil cases generally would be to infuse a requirement of
exhaustion of state judicial remedies before a section 1983 plaintiff could file
a federal suit is subject to criticism. 74 The majority based its conclusion on
70. 583 F.2d ,at 1252, citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424

U.S. 800 (1975).
71. 424 U.S. at 814-16. See note 26 supra.
72. See 424 U.S. at 816, citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943). The Supreme Court in Great Lakes stated:
This Court has recognized that the federal courts, in the exercise of the sound discretion which has traditionally guided courts of equity in granting or withholding the extraordinary relief which they may afford, will not ordinarily restrain state officers from
collecting state taxes where state law affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer ...
This withholding of extraordinary relief by courts having authority to give it is not a denial
of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred on the federal courts, or of the settled
rule that the measure of inadequacy of the plaintiff's legal remedy is the legal remedy
afforded by the federal not the state courts. . . . On the contrary, it is but a recognition
that the jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts embraces suits in equity as well as at
law, and that a federal court of equity, which may in an appropriate case refuse to give its
special protection to private rights when the exercise of its jurisdiction would be prejudicial to the public interest . . ., should stay its hand in the public interest when it reasonably appears that private interests will not suffer.
Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted). In addition to the language of Great Lakes, which was not a
§ 1983 case, Congress has enacted a statutory prohibition which bars federal courts from enjoining
states in tax matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). Specifically, § 1341 provides: "The district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under
state law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
Id. Thus, if Colorado River is controlling as to when abstention is appropriate, the Third Circuit
in the instant case may have erred in not disrhissing the suit under the Great Lakes exception
to federal intervention.
73. The district court, relying on Younger to dismiss the case, failed to decide the question
of whether the inslant case would fall within the purview of § 1341. See 436 F. Supp. at 158
n.5.
74. See 583 F.2d at 1250. Huffman required a losing state litigant to exhaust his state appellate remedies. See 420 U.S. at 609. Exhaustion of appellate remedies, it is submitted, is not
tantamount to a total exhaustion requirement. As the Court in Huffman noted:
By requiring exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purposes of applying
Younger, we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape, 356 U.S. 167 (1961). There we held
that one seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need
not first initiate state proceedings based on related state causes of action. 356 U.S. at 183.
Monroe v. Pape had nothing to do with the problem presently before us, that of the
deference to be accorded state proceedings which have already been initiated and which
afford a competent tribunal for the resolution of federal issues.
Our exhaustion requirement is likewise not inconsistent with such cases as City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934), and Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232
U.S. 134 (1914), which expressed the doctrine that a federal equity plaintiff challenging
state administrative action need not have exhausted his state judicial remedies. Those
cases did not deal with situations in which the state judicial process had been initiated.
Id. n.21. Moreover, at least one commentator has offered grounds distinguishing Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), from cases involving a request for federal injunctive relief:
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the assumption that Younger, when read in light of Hicks v. Miranda,75
would allow a federal defendant to avoid litigating in the federal forum by
counterfiling in state court at any time prior to substantial proceedings on
the merits in federal court. 76 Prior to Johnson, however, no federal court
had applied the Hicks definition of "pending state proceeding" in a civil
context. Since Hicks was a criminal case, it is submitted that its rationale is
not necessarily applicable in a section 1983 context. Rather, the greater state
interest in protecting the integrity of its criminal proceedings 77 warrants a
liberal construction of when "substantial federal proceedings" have begun for
abstention purposes. In a civil case, conversely, it is reasonable for either
forum to respect the initial filing of the complaint in the other forum, 78 and
if Hicks does not apply, a section 1983 litigant could still bypass state
courts without fear that a countersuit in state court would require federal
79
abstention.
Finally, as Judge Aldisert appropriately noted, a construction of Trdinor
which limits abstention to cases where a state is a party loses sight of the
policies of comity and federalism which underlie the Younger doctrine. 80

As

Justice Stevens acknowledged in Trainor, "the fact that a State is a party to
a pending proceeding should make it less objectionable to have the constitutional issue adjudicated in a federal forum than if only private litigants were

involved." 8 1
As a result of the Third Circuit's decision in Johnson, the decisional
split among the circuits concerning the applicability of the Younger doctrine
to civil proceedings has been clearly delineated.8 2 In view of the Burger
It is true, however, that the plaintiff in Monroe was not required to pursue a state
cause of action despite the absence of any showing that the state remedy was unavailable
in practice or unfairly administered. This might be explained by the fact that Monroe was
an action for damages and there is doubt whether the federal courts have power to refuse
to act when legal rather than equitable relief is sought.
Note, supra note 52, at 1204 (footnotes omitted).
75. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
76. 583 F.2d at 1250, 1252.
77. It is submitted that one must distinguish between the issue of 4he applicability of
Younger abstention and the related issue of what constitutes a pending proceeding for the purposes of Younger abstention. Juidice recognized that Younger abstention may apply notwithstanding the fact that the state interest protected may be a lesser one than the criminal
system. 420 U.S. at 335. Assuming that Younger abstention applies to state interests of varying
importance, it is submitted that where the state interest protected is of greater importance, the
state should be allowed the greater opportunity to adjudicate the case, and not be overriden by
technical considerations such as filing dates. This is precisely what the Court held in Hicks. See
notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra. Since Hicks was a criminal case, it is submitted that
the Court's liberal interpretation of a pending state proceeding was necessary to protect the
integrity of the state interest, which the Juidice Court ranked above civil matters, and not a
broad mandate applicable to all state interests possibly within the purview of Younger abstention. See generally Bartels, Avoiding A Comity Of Errors: A Model For Adjudicating Federal
Civil Suits That "Interfere" With State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1976).
78. See Bartels, supra note 77, at 64 & n.205.
79. See notes 22-24 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
80. 583 F.2d at 1252 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
81. 431 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also note 60 supra.
82. See notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra.
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Court's tendency to restrict access to the federal courts,8 3 it is submitted
that the Court, if it chooses to define the boundaries of the Younger doctrine, will adopt the rationale of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Nottingham Liquors and Kiroff.84 As the Supreme Court
85
retreats from the expansive jurisprudential philosophy of the Warren era,
the steady advance of the doctrine of abstention should continue until there
exists pervasive federal abstention wherever a state claim, either criminal or
civil, is pending.
Absent Supreme Court adjudication, however, the issue is far from resolved despite the Johnson majority's refusal to extend the doctrine of
Younger abstention to cases in which the state was not a party to the pending civil claim. 86 The conflicting rationale advanced by Judge Aldisert 8 7 and
the Sixth Circuit 88 will further the confusion among the lower federal
courts. Such a dichotomy is unavoidable, however, as it rests, as must any
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court, upon the philosophical perspectives of the decision maker with respect to the accessibility to the federal
courts.
Kevin Silverang

83. See Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U. FLA.
L. REV. 904, 905 (1976).

84.
85.
86.
87.

See
See
583
583

notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also note 21 supra.
F.2d at 1252. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
F.2d at 1252-58 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See notes 53-62 and accompanying text

supra.

88. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
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EvI-

DENCE 804(b)(1)-FORMER TESTIMONY EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE-A SUFFICIENT COMMUNITY OF INTEREST SATISFIES THE
"PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST" LANGUAGE OF THE RULE.

Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc. (1978)
Alvarez and Lloyd, two seamen employed by American Export Lines,
Inc. (Export), were involved in an altercation while aboard the S.S. Export
Commerce.' Alleging negligence under the Jones Act 2 and unseaworthiness under general maritime law,3 Lloyd sued Export in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover for personal injuries. 4 Export joined Alvarez as a third-party defendant, and Alvarez counterclaimed against Export for negligence and unseaworthiness. 5
6
The district court dimissed Lloyd's complaint for failure to prosecute.
The counterclaim by Alvarez was tried, however, and the jury returned
a verdict for Export on the unseaworthiness claim, but awarded $95,000 to
Alvarez on the negligence claim. 7 The district court had refused to admit
into evidence testimony concerning the fight aboard ship and the history of
animosity between the two men given by Lloyd at a prior Coast Guard proceeding.8 Alvarez' testimony thus stood uncontradicted at trial. 9 The United

1. Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1181 (3d Cir. 1978). The ship was
anchored in the port of Yokohama, Japan, at the time of the fight. Id.
2. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The purpose of the Jones Act is to benefit and protect seamen
who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1935).
The Jones Act reads in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury ....
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
3. 580 F.2d at 1181. For a definition of "unseaworthiness," see Klarman v. Santini, 363 F.
Supp. 910, 915 (D. Conn. 1973) ("unseaworthiness" is a condition which arises from a defect in
a vessel's hull, gear, appurtenances, and in some circumstances, her crew); Franklin v. Doric
Shipping and Trading Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. La. 1972) ("unseaworthiness" is a
condition whereby a vessel or its equipment or method is not reasonably fit).
4. 580 F.2d at 1184. Lloyd was hospitalized for almost a month as a result of his injuries
from the fight. id. Federal judisdiction is provided under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970). See note 2 supra.
5. 580 F.2d at 1181.
6. Id. Lloyd failed to appear on seven occasions for a pretrial deposition. Id. Furthermore,
Lloyd's counsel was unable to procure his appearance for trial despite extensive efforts. Id. at
1184. These failures were partly attributable to Lloyd's seafaring occupation. Id.
7. Id. at 1181.
8. Id. at 1182. The prior proceeding was held at the discretion of the Coast Guard to
determine whether Lloyd's merchant marine license should be suspended or revoked for misconduct based on the fight with Alvarez. Id. Testimony was received under oath before a professional hearing examiner, allowing both direct and cross-examination. id. Both Lloyd and
Alvarez were represented by counsel. Id. The two charges brought against Lloyd of assault and
failure to perform his duties due to intoxication were dismissed. Id. at 1183.

(346)

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss2/7

52

Editors: Federal Practice and Procedure

1978-1979]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1o reversed and remanded,
holding that a sufficient community of interest between Alvarez and the
Coast Guard satisfied the predecessor in interest requirement of rule
804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (rule 804(b)(1) or rule) 11 so as to
allow Lloyd's former testimony to be admitted into evidence in the subsequent trial. Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.
1978).
Testimony given in a prior proceeding, known as former testimony,
traditionally has been recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. ' 2

The

hearsay rule requires that all statements offered for the truth of the matter
asserted 13 be proffered by a witness testifying under oath,' 4 subject to
cross-examination, 15 while in the presence of the trier of fact.' 6 These

The district court had also refused to admit into evidence a Coast Guard Decision and
Order and a prior conviction against Alvarez resulting from a criminal proceeding in Japan
concerning the fight with Alvarez. Id. at 1183, 1190.
9. Id. at 1182. Alvarez and Lloyd, as participants, were the only eyewitnesses to the fight.
Since Lloyd was unavailable as both a plaintiff and witness, Alvarez' version of the altercation
went to the jury unopposed. Id.
10. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Aldisert, and Judge Stern of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Aldisert wrote the majority opinion. Judge Stern wrote a concurring opinion.
11. Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding . .. if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action® or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
12. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1896); Comment, Hearsay Under the
Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1201 (1969).
13. One commentator offers the following definition of hearsay: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972). Hearsay as defined in the Federal Rules of
Evidence "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EID. 801(c).
See also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
14. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945) (an oath acts as a safeguard against false
testimony by providing fear of prosecution for perjury).
15. See Novicki v. Department of Fin., 373 Il. 342, 344, 26 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1940) (rule
against hearsay evidence founded on necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination); Sconce
v. Jones, 343 Mo. 362, 369, 121 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1938) (reason for excluding testimony made
out of court is that the test of cross-examination is unavailable as a safeguard against inaccuracies).
Professor Wigmore offers several reasons why cross-examination is essential. He has noted
that cross-examination of a witness promotes extraction of the remaining qualifying circumstances left undisclosed by direct examination. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
1368, at 37 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). Cross-examination may also be the only available means of
testing the credibility or personal trustworthiness of the witness. Id. One major advantage is
that cross-examination immediately follows the direct examination in time, so that any modifications or discredit produced by the elicited facts more readily confronts the tribunal. Id. at 38.
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common law requirements were designed to insure the utilization of the
most credible testimony available by affording the trier of fact an opportunity
to directly evaluate the perception, memory, and narration of the witness. 17
The hearsay rule, however, is replete with exceptions ", based on necessity
and guarantees of trustworthiness. 19
Admission of former testimony, a specific exception to the hearsay rule,
initially required that the declarant be unavailable to testify. 20 A common

Finally, the witness himself may refute implications made by the cross-examiner, thus making
his testimony more readily believed. Id.
16. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965). The Douglas Court observed that
personal testimony by the witness compels him to stand "face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 419, quoting Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
17. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 177 (1948). The problem of narration arises "[w]here the evidence of Declarant's conduct
is offered for a purpose which requires [the] Trier to rely upon the meaning with which Declarant himself used the language." Id. at 197. Sincerity is sometimes considered a fourth factor in
evaluating the testimony of a witness, but it is encompassed within the other three; 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-01 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGEn].

18. See Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632, 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1057 (1969) (two basic tests for exceptions to hearsay rule are: 1) that evidence must be necessary to a proper consideration of the case; and 2) that the evidence exhibit an intrinsic probability of trustworthiness); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396
(5th Cir. 1961) (hearsay rule is not absolute but replete with exceptions; necessity means that
unless hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it elicits may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or unavailable or because evidence of similar value cannot be obtained); United
States v. Wescoat, 49 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1931) (trustworthiness exits when entries are
made by officials in discharge of their duties with no motive to state anything but the truth, and
where they are subject to reprimand and humiliation in the eyes of associates if inaccurate).
19. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 255, at 616-17. Illustrative of considerations reviewed in developing a hearsay exception is rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states in pertinent part:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence ....
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
20. Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1952); Smyth v. Inhabitants of New Providence Township, 263 F. 481 (3d Cir. 1920).
Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines unavailability of a witness to include
situations when the declarant
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
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law requirement of an identity of parties and issues also developed as a
requisite to admission. 2 ' Judicial practice traditionally mandated that in
order for former testimony to be introduced against a party in a later trial,
that party or someone with whom he was in privity 2 2 must have been a
23
party to the proceeding in which that testimony was originally elicited.
In promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 the United States
Supreme Court examined the question of whether strict identity or privity
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance (or in the case of the hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2),
(3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
Unavailability of the witness as a requisite to admitting hearsay evidence distinguishes rule
804 from rule 803. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803. Rule 803 allows hearsay into evidence regardless of
whether the witness is available or not. Id. It "proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be
available.'" Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 803. Rule 804, however, by requiring
that the declarant be unavailable, proceeds upon a different theory: "[T]estimony given on the
stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred
over complete loss of evidence of the declarant." Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID.
804.
21. See Smyth v. Inhabitants of New Providence Township, 263 F. 481, 486-87 (3d Cir.
1920) (testimony given by deceased witness in another action between substantially the same
parties and involving substantially the same issue admitted); Wolf v. United Air Lines, 12
F.R.D. 1, 3 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (testimony given in prior action is admissible if there is an identity
of issues and an identity of parties).
22. For cases which state that "privies" means claiming under the former parties, see
McAlister v. Dungan, 108 Cal. App. 185, 188, 291 P. 419, 420 (1930); Inhabitants of Ellsworth
v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 125 Me. 214, 215, 132 A. 423, 424 (1926). See also Metropolitan St.
Ry. Co. v. Gumby, 99 F. 199 (2d Cir. 1900) (the newcomer must be in privity with the former
party in blood, in estate, or in law); S.W. Anderson Co. v. Glenn, 43 F. Supp. 334, 338 (W.D.
Ky. 1942) (identity of parties comprehends privies in blood, in law and in estate). Cf. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Linard, 57 F.R.D. 552, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (prior testimony
exception to hearsay rule requires identity of interest and motive between party opponents);
Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 20, 160 S.W. 2d 740, 745 (1942) (test is
one of identity of interests between party-opponents and not of privity as term used in the law
of property).
Some commentators have found the application of privity too rigid a concept in accordance
with the notions of necessity and trustworthiness warranting the exception to the hearsay rule.
C. McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 256, at 620; J. WiGMORE, supra note 15 § 1388, at 118.
The judicial practice of requiring privity between the party against whom such testimony
was offered previously and the party against whom the prior testimony is offered presently is
analogous to the privity requirement applicable in the res judicata and estoppel doctrines.
Wigmore dismisses any similarities between the former testimony rule and res judicata and
estoppel principles as too mechanical. Id. at 119. Wigmore states that the rules of property law
investigated under res judicata and collateral estoppel should not be relied upon in solving an
evidentiary question because the judicial concerns in admitting former testimony focus upon
whether a thorough and adequate cross-examination has been performed. Id.
23. United States v. Allison, 474 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1973)
(under proper circumstances, testimony from grand jury proceedings may be admitted under
prior reported testimony exception to hearsay rule); Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 542-43
(4th Cir. 1969) (testimony given at Coast Guard proceeding admissible); Bailey v. Woods, 17
N.H. 365, 372 (1845) (testimony given in hearing before arbitrators admitted).
24. The original Advisory Committee draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence was published
in 1969 and revised by the Supreme Court, House of Representatives, and the Senate before it
became effective on July 1, 1975. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at vii-xil See H.R.
5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
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between parties should remain a requirement with respect to the party
against whom such testimony is offered, 25 and eliminated a strict identity
requirement in its draft of the rules presented to the House of Representatives. 26 The Supreme Court draft, however, was amended by the House
Committee, 2 7 which narrowed the scope of parties capable of utilizing
former testimony by inserting the "predecessor in interest" language contained in the rule. 28 The Senate found little difference between the two
29
versions and adopted the House amendment.
0
The "predecessor in interest" language 3 included in the adopted rule
lacks significant judicial interpretation, 31 as only two cases have attempted to
analyze the rule. In In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation,32 a federal antitrust action led to the initiation of a private class action suit in which defendants sought to introduce the testimony of a witness from the prior federal

25. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at 804-20.

26. Id. at 804-21. Modern authority supports the trend away from strict identity of parties to
an identity of interests characterization. See Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 542-43 (4th
Cir. 1969) (testimony at Coast Guard proceeding admissible in wrongful death action); Bartlett
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 21, 160 S.W.2d 740, 745 (1942) (testimony in suit
by husband admissible in suit by wife); Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417, 421
(Okla. 1958) (testimony against one partner in arson trial admissible in action on fire policy by
partners).
27. Congress added the language shown in italics and deleted the bracketed material from
the Supreme Court rule:
(1) Former testimony-Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the
same or another proceeding, [at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest
similar to those of the party against whom now offered,] if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 17, at 804-07.
The House Committee stated that
[t]he essential difference between the two versions is the House's substitution of the
common law's "same party" or "predecessor in interest" test in place of the more simple
"with motive and interest similar to those of the party against whom offered" test provided in the subsection as submitted by the Court.
Id. quoting Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, at 53-54.
These policy determinations were evidenced in the House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee's Report, which
[c]onsidered it generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously
handled by another party. The sole exception to this . . . is when a party's predecessor in
interest in a civil action or proceeding had an opportunity and similar motive to examine
the witness.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at 804-07, 808, quoting HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
28. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17,
804(b)(1)[05], at 804-65.
29. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at
28 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7074.
30. See note 11 supra.
31. To date, there is no case law interpreting identical state rules of evidence. See, e.g.,
ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); ME. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
32. 72 F.R.D. 108 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976).
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trial. 3z In determining whether the United States Government could be
deemed the "predecessor in interest" of the private litigants for rule
804(b)(1) purposes, the court concluded that "special considerations" made
the Government the predecessor in interest in the prior action. 34 Due to
the "unique relationship between the Government's antitrust enforcement
suits and the private actions which follow," 35 the court admitted the prior
testimony. 36
0
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
refused to apply the "unique relationship" test established in Master Key to
determine the admissibility of prior testimony in In re IBM PeripheralEDP
Devices Antitrust Litigation.37 In this consolidated antitrust suit, 38 defendants sought a pretrial resolution concerning admission of former testimony
from three designated cases in which it had been a party. 39 Plaintiff objected to the use of such testimony on a hearsay basis since it had not been a
party to these previous cases. 40 Defendant claimed that in each of the three
prior cases there was a party "with the opportunity to examine and with a
motive similar or identical to that which . . . [the plaintiff] now has to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examinations." 41 Referring

to the legislative history of rule 804(b)(1), 42 however, the court found that
Congress had expressly rejected that argument. 4 3 The defendant also
claimed that the plaintiffs in the prior cases were predecessors in interest of
the current plaintiff.44 The court, however, adopted a narrow, literal definition of "predecessor in interest," 45 thus precluding admission of the former
46
testimony from those cases.

33. 72 F.R.D. at 109.
34. The court concluded:
[Tihere are special considerations which weigh in favor of holding that the United States
was a predecessor in interest of the present plaintiffs. The unique relationship between
the Government's antitrust enforcement suits and the private actions which follow has
Congressional recognition and ratification, which has in turn provided special benefits to
the private plaintiffs. It has, for example, tolled the applicable statute of limitations, and
thus allowed them to extend the period for which they may recover. . . . Furthermore,
the judgment in the earlier decision will be admissible in evidence (although it too is
hearsay) and serves to establish their prima facie case.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 444 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The matter before the court arose on a motion
to overrule objections to the admission of relevant former testimony. Id. at 111.
38. Two separate suits were brought against IBM and were consolidated for trial. Id. at 110.
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corporation was the plaintiff in one action, and Memorex Corporation
was the plaintiff in the other. Id.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 113.
42. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
43. 444 F. Supp. at 113.
44. Id.
45. The court quoted Judge Weinstein as follows:
The term "predecessor in interest" was apparently used in its old, narrow, substantive law
sense. It could not have been used in an evidentiary sense, where probative force would
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The Lloyd court began its analysis of rule 804(b)(1) by determining that
Lloyd was unavailable at the time of the trial. 4 7 The court then addressed
the question of whether Alvarez or a predecessor in interest had the "'opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination' as required by 804(b)(1)." 4
The court rejected the district court's strict view of the rule and its refusal under that interpretation to
admit the proffered evidence. 49 Since Congress had failed to define "predecessor in interest," 50 the court examined the legislative history of the rule
in order to determine congressional intent. 5 1 Having compared the Supreme Court draft originally submitted 52 with the rule finally adopted by
Congress, 53 the Third Circuit adopted the Senate Committee's conclusion
that little difference existed between the two versions. 54 In its analysis, the
court considered the goal of section (b) of the rule as a whole, 55 noting that
its purpose was to balance the recognized risk of denying the fact finder
important relevant evidence and the risk of introducing testimony by a non56
witness.
Due to the similarity between the proffered Court draft and the
adopted rule, and the fact that the Supreme Court version would have relaxed the privity requirement necessary under common law, 57 the Third Circuit
concluded that rule 804(b)(1) would allow the former testimony to be admitted into evidence as long as there existed a "sufficient community of
interest shared by the Coast Guard in its hearing and Alvarez in the sub-

be its rationale, since it would then be equivalent to "those having similiar motive and
opportunity to develop the testimony"-a concept rejected by Congress.
Id., quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17,
804(b)(1)[04], at 804-65.
46. 444 F. Supp. at 113.
47. 580 F.2d at 1184. In regard to the unavailability status of Lloyd as a witness, the court
ruled: "We are satisfied that where Export and Lloyd's counsel were unable to obtain his appearance in an action in which he had a formidable interest as a plaintiff, his unavailability
status was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 804." Id. For a discussion of the unavailability rule, see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
48. 580 F.2d at 1184-85.
49. Id. at 1185.
50. Id.
51. Id. Although the Lloyd court found "no definitive guidance in the reports accompanying
the language changes made as the Rules were considered, in turn, by the Supreme Court and
houses of Congress," id., it did take into consideration that, in agreement with the Senate
Committee, the additional language of "predecessor in interest" did little to distinguish the
congressional rule from the Supreme Court draft. Id. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 7074.
52. 580 F.2d at 1185.
53. Id. For the changes that the House made in the Supreme Court draft, see note 27
supra.
54. Id. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
55. 580 F.2d at 1185. Section (b) of rule 804 has five subdivisions entitled: 1) Former testimony; 2) Statement under belief of impending death; 3) Statement against interest; 4) Statement of personal or family history; and 5) Other exceptions. FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
56. 580 F.2d at 1185. The Lloyd court adopted this view under the preference approach to
the hearsay exception expressed by the drafters of the rule.
57. For the text of the Supreme Court's draft of rule 804(b)(1), see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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sequent civil trial." 58 The court developed this community of interest concept by equating public and private interest. 59 It found that the individual
and public interests merged 60 in the case sub judice because the nucleus of
operative facts was the same in the Coast Guard proceeding and the subsequent civil trial, 6 and the basic interest advanced by the Coast Guard and
Alvarez coincided. 62 Moreover, the court asserted that the principles underlying the exception to the hearsay rule focus on the ultimate search for
truth and justice.6 3 The Third Circuit thus offered what it considered to be
a "practical and expedient view" of rule 804(b)(1) that furthered the congressional intent behind its promulgation."
58. 580 F.2d at 1185-86. The Lloyd court substituted this "community of interest" analysis
for a literal interpretation of the rule: "With this approach in mind, we are satisfied that there
existed, in the language of Rule 804(b)(1), sufficient 'opportunity and similar motive [for the
Court Guard investigating officer] to develop [Lloyd's] testimony' at the former hearing to justify its admission ..
"" Id. at 1186-87 (brackets supplied by the court).
The majority never explicitly considered a privity analysis in its interpretation of "predecessor in interest." Judge Stern, in a concurring opinion, specifically disagreed with the majority,
asserting that privity between the Coast Guard officer and Alvarez must be present if Lloyd's
former testimony were to be admitted under rule 804(b)(1). Id. at 1190-92 (Stern, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Stern's concurring opinion, see notes 65-69 and accompanying
text infra.
59. 580 F.2d at 1186. The court based its community of interest formula on a merger of
both public and private interests. Id. Since the court reasoned that interests in law came'from
individuals either collectively or singularly, the Coast Guard, as a representative of the larger
public interest, sought to satisfy the very interests that Alvarez as an individual subsequently
brought before the district court. Id. The court noted that Alvarez sought to protect his individual interest in seeking compensation for his injuries while the Coast Guard sought to protect
the public interest in a safe and orderly merchant marine service. Id. According to the court,
the Coast Guard officer attempted to establish at the hearing what Alvarez, as the private
litigant, would subsequently try to prove at trial: Lloyd's intoxication, his agressive role in the
fight, and the prior conflicts between the men. Id.
60. Id. The court stated that "[i]t must be borne in mind that often we have here different
ways of looking at the same claims or same type of claims as they are asserted in different
titles." Id., quoting Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943). See note
59 supra.
61. 580 F.2d at 1186. The facts involved in the Coast Guard hearing and the civil trial
concerned the conduct of both Alvarez and Lloyd aboard the ship S.S. Export Commerce up to
and including the date of the fight. Id. For an account of the Coast Guard hearing, see note 8
supra.
62. 580 F.2d at 1186. According to the court, the basic interests advanced by both the Coast
Guard and Alvarez were determination of culpability and imposition of a penalty for the alleged
condemned behavior. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1187. The "practical and expedient view" language is quoted from McCormick,
who felt that progressive courts should recognize that
neither identity of parties nor privity between parties is essential. These are merely
means to an end. Consequently, if it appears that in the former suit a party having a like
motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the present party would have, was
accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination, the testimony may be received
against the present party.
Id., quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 256, at 620.
The court's summation of rule 804(b)(1) -relied on McCormick's statement that "[u]nder
these circumstances, the previous party having like motive to develop the testimony about the
same material facts is, in the final analysis, a predecessor in interest to the present party." 580
F.2d at 1187.
The Third Circuit also disagreed with the district court's refusal to admit into evidence
both a Coast Guard Decision and Order from the prior Coast Guard hearing and a prior convic-
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Stern disagreed with the majority's
analysis. 6 5 He stated that the rule's legislative history 66 indicated that the
rule's "predecessor in interest" language required the finding of a privity
6 7
relationship between the parties of the former and previous hearings.
Judge Stern concluded that such a relationship did not exist between the
Coast Guard and Alvarez in the case at bar, 68 but would nevertheless have
69
admitted Lloyd's testimony under rule 804(b)(5).
Although the Lloyd court reviewed the legislative history in its analysis
of the rule, 70 it is submitted that the court's treatment of the reasoning
behind the language change that implemented the "predecessor in interest"
terminology was superficial. By citing the Senate Committee's conclusion
that there was little difference between the two versions, 71 the court purportedly justified the utilization of a community of interest analysis allowing for
a broad interpretation of the rule.7 2 By noting that "the difference between
the two versions is not great," 73 however, it is submitted that the Senate
Committee did not imply that the two versions were coextensive. It is thus
suggested that the court resurrected what Congress explicitly rejected 74 in
' 5
defining "predecessor in interest" in terms of "community of interest."
It should be noted, however, that some support exists for the Third Circuit's
interpretation of the rule. 76 Professors Wigmore and McCormick advocate a
77
former testimony rule relaxing the strict common law requirement of privity.

tion in a Japanese criminal proceeding against Alvarez. Id. at 1183, 1190. The court refused to
review other issues raised-the possible inconsistency between the finding of negligence and
the finding of no breach of warranty of seaworthiness, the question whether a judgement n.o.v.
should have been entered on the unseaworthiness claim, and the issue of maintenance and
cure-because it ordered a new trial as to all the issues presented in the Alvarez counterclaim.
Id. at 1190.
65. Id. at 1190-92 (Stern, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 1190 (Stern, J., concurring). See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
67. 580 F.2d at 1191 (Stern, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Stern, J., concurring). See note 22 supra.
69. 580 F.2d at 1192 (Stern, J., concurring). For contents of the rule, see note 19 supra.
70. 580 F.2d at 1185.
71. Id. See notes 29, 51 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
72. 580 F.2d at 1187. The court noted initially that Congress did not define "predecessor in
interest." Id. at 1185. See note 51 and accompanying text supra. It therefore did not feel
constrained by statutory limitations to conceptualize the interest embraced by the specific language of the rule. 580 F.2d at 1186.
73. 580 F.2d at 1185. See note 27 supra.
74. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17,
804(b)(1) [04], at 804-65.
75. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the parties' community of interest, see notes
58-62 and accompanying text supra.
76. See C.McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 256, at 619-20; J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, §
1388, at 111. For a summary of McCormick's view, see note 64 supra. For a summary of
Wigmore's view, see note 77 infra.
77. Wigmore stated that the reason for requiring privity between the parties
is that ...the interest to sift the testimony thoroughly was the same for the other person
as for the present person. The principle, then, is that where the interest of the person
was calculated to induce equally as thorough a testing by cross-examination, then the
present opponent has had adequate protection for the same end. Thus, the requirement
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The pertinent question, however, in determining the propriety of the
Lloyd decision is whether Congress employed the "predecessor in interest"
language in its substantive law sense or in its evidentiary sense. 78 While
the majority of writers commenting on the "predecessor in interest" terminology have considered it to be limited to its substantive sense, the Lloyd
court disagreed. 7 9 This result was caused in part by the dearth of case law
interpreting the rule, which rendered the Lloyd court particularly amenable
to an analysis of the equities of the case before it. It is submitted that such
equities clearly influenced the court's decision to interpret the rule as it
did. 80 The court's equitable rather than strictly legal analysis of the hearsay
exception focused *on a trial court's general mandate to ascertain the
truth.8 1 Consistent with that purpose was the concept that rule 804(b)(1) is
a rule of preference,8 2 permitting qualified evidence to be admitted where it
might otherwise be excluded.
The finding of similarity between the public interests represented by
the Coast Guard and the private interests of a litigant in a civil trial 8 3 satisfied the Lloyd court that the Coast Guard had protected Alvarez' present
interests in examining Lloyd.8 4 By interpreting "predecessor in interest"
solely in terms of an identity of issues analysis, however, it is submitted that
the court ignored the common law safeguard of identity of parties. 85 Indeed, it was this very identity of parties requirement that distinguished the
86
congressional rule from the draft submitted by the Supreme Court.

of identity of parties is after all only an incident or corollary of the requirement as to
identity of issue.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 1388, at 111. Wigmore concluded that similar motive and interest between parties suffices without privity between the parties. Id. For a summary of
McCormick's position, which is similar to that of Wigmore, see note 64 supra.
78. For Weinstein's view as quoted by the court, see note 45 supra.
79. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 804(b)(1) [04], at 804-65; 11 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE
804.04[2], at VIII-265 (2d ed. 1975). Although Wigmore and McCormick favored a
rule without a privity or an identity of parties requirement, such proposals were not made as
interpretations of the accepted federal rule and therefore do not aid in deciding whether privity
is necessary under rule 804(b)(1).
80. The court knew that a contradictory story of the incident existed. 580 F.2d at 1183. This
story had been outlined by Lloyd under oath at a government proceeding at which crossexamination was allowed. Id. at 1182. Two of the three common law requirements, that the
witness testify under oath subject to cross-examination, therefore remained protected because
of the procedure followed at the Coast Guard hearing. For a discussion of the common law
requirements of the hearsay rule, see notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
81. 580 F.2d at 1186.
82. See notes 20 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
83. 580 F.2d at 1186. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
84. 580 F.2d at 1186. See notes 58 & 59 supra.
85. Congress, by rejecting the Supreme Court draft, reinstated the common law rule of
identity of parties with respect to those against whom former testimony may be introduced. See
MOORE, supra note 79, 804.04[2], at VIII-265.
86. Id. By emphasizing identity of interests and equating public and private interests, the
Third Circuit's analysis in Lloyd resembles the analy.sis propounded in In re Master Key Litigation, which has already been limited to its facts by one court. See notes 32-46 and accompanying text supra.
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It is thus submitted that the Third Circuit's interpretation of rule
804(b)(1) contradicts congressional intent. The court failed to adequately distinguish the legislative history since the difference between the two versions
of the rule, no matter how minimal, 8 7 must be explained. Congress rejected
the Supreme Court draft because it considered it unfair to burden one party
88
with the manner in which a witness was handled by a former party.
Moreover, by adding the "predecessor in interest" language to the initial
draft, Congress narrowed the rule as submitted by the Supreme Court. 8 9
The Lloyd court nevertheless interpreted rule 804(b)(1) pursuant to the Supreme Court's proposed version.
In so doing, the Third Circuit has set a precedent for expansive use of
former testimony. Other circuits may choose not to adopt the Lloyd test 9 0
and may formulate a privity requirement for rule 804(b)(1) similar to that of
the Peripheral EDP Devices court. 91
Amy D. Kanengiser
87. In ascertaining the legislative intent from the language of the rule, "words used therein
are to be given their ordinary meaning unless the context shows that they are differently used."
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46-47 (1934) (interpretation of state taxing statute). It is
therefore submitted that the court should not ignore the additional words "predecessor in interest" appended to the Supreme Court draft by Congress. See id.
88. See note 27 supra.
89. 2 B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE 9:22 (6th ed. Supp. 1978); WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 17,
804(b)(1)[04], at 804-65.
90. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra.
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OF CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY BY GAS SUPPLY COMPANY DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT.

Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1977)
Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) and Texas Eastern Transmission Company

(Texas Eastern) entered into a contract' in which Gulf warranted to deliver
minimum amounts of natural gas to Texas Eastern, 2 a pipeline company, for
ultimate.distribution in the Philadelphia area. 3 Pursuant to section 7(c) of
the Natural Gas Act (Act),4 the Federal Power Commission (FPC) approved
5
the agreement and issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Subsequently Gulf began to make regular underdeliveries of gas in violation
of section 7(b) of the Act. 6 Following an administrative hearing in which the
7
FPC ordered Gulf to comply prospectively with its contractual obligations,
1. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 612-14 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. Id. at 589. Upon examination of the contract, the Third Circuit found that Gulf was
obligated to deliver a daily minimum of 625,000 Mcf (thousand cubic feet) of natural gas upon
Texas Eastern's request. Id. at 595.
3. 570 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978). Texas Eastern,
which supplied gas to local utilities, was one of two pipeline companies which delivered 97
percent of the natural gas used in Pennsylvania. 570 F.2d at 1141.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976). Section 7 provides in pertinent part: "No natural-gas company . . . shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission ....
unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or
operations; . . ." Id.
5. 570 F.2d at 1141.
6. See 563 F.2d at 593. Section 7(b) of the Act requires:
(b) No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities,
without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due
hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is
depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present
or future public convenience or necessity permit such an abandonment.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976). After it began deliveries of natural gas, Gulf discovered that it had
vastly overestimated reserves in wells designated for delivery to Texas Eastern. 563 F.2d at 593.
Gulf petitioned the FPC for an increase in rates, but the Commission denied their request in
two opinions. See F.P.C. Op. No. 692, UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH) 11,528 (Apr. 19, 1974);
F.P.C. Op. No. 692-A, UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH) 11,570 (Aug. 30, 1974). As a result, Gulf
failed to meet its obligations intermittently in 1971, and continued to make underdeliveries on a
regular basis. 570 F.2d at 1144-45.
7. F.P.C. Op. No. 780, UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH) $ 869 (Oct. 15, 1976), aff'd, F.P.C.
Op. No. 780-A. UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH) 1 11,882 (Dec. 9, 1976). Gulf appealed the FPC's
findings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where the order was
upheld. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
In addition to the order compelling prospective compliance, the FPC also ordered Gulf to
make refunds to Texas Eastern for ultimate distribution to consumers. 570 F.2d at 1142. Rather
than requiring Gulf to refund to consumers their actual cost of covering the gas shortages, the
agency limited the refunds to the difference in cost between Texas Eastern's requests for gas
and Gulf's actual deliveries, multiplied by the difference between the contract price and the
applicable market price for that area. Id. Futhermore, the FPC created a recoupment schedule
under which Gulf could recover all refunds paid to consumers for its underdeliveries. Id. After
Gulf had delivered a quantity of gas equal to the contract amount, less the portion for which it
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several consumers instituted two class actions against Gulf in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking damages, 8 equitable relief, and costs resulting from Gulf's failure to deliver the
specified amounts of gas. 9 The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs'
claims 10 but certified an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether a private cause of action could be implied under the provisions of the Act. 11 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit1 2 affirmed the district
court's decision,1 3 holding that the Natural Gas Act does not impliedly permit a private cause of action for a gas supply company's failure to comply
had paid refunds, Gulf could petition the FPC for a rate change equal to the contract price plus
the value of all refunds paid. Id. n.3.
8. 570 F.2d at 1140. Two class actions were filed against Gulf. The Clark plaintiffs sought
to represent consumers whose natural gas was supplied by Philadelphia Gas Works (PGW). Id.
The Thompson plaintiffs alleged that they represented consumers of gas supplied by Philadelphia Electric Company. Id. The plaintiffs requested class certification under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, asserting that they adequately represented the interests of Philadelphia gas users. 570 F.2d at 1140. In granting the class certifications, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated the
two actions. Id. In addition, PGW intervened as plaintiff to assert a claim arising out of the
same defaults in Gulf's natural gas deliveries. Id.
9. 570 F.2d at 1140. The complaints alleged that the refunds allowed by the FPC, whether
based upon area or national rates, did not fully compensate their expenditures occasioned by
Gulf's failure to make full deliveries. Id. at 1142.
In addition, the plaintiffs filed complaints against Texas Eastern and Philadelphia Electric
Co. (PECO) for damages arising out of the same shortage in deliveries. Id. at 1141. The district
court dismissed the claim against PECO for lack of complete diversity of citizenship, required
under § 1332 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). 570 F.2d at 1141. The district court
reserved judgment on the antitrust claim against Texas Eastern pending resolution of a possible
cause of action implied under the Natural Gas Act. Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., Nos. 76-2106 and
76-2711, slip op. at 17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1977) (memorandum and order granting motions to
dismiss).
10. Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., Nos. 76-2106 and 76-2711, slip op. at 7-18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28,
1977). See 570 F.2d at 1141.
11. 570 F.2d at 1141. The district court granted certification under § 1292(b) of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), allowing the plaintiffs to take an interlocutory appeal limited
to this issue in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 570 F.2d at 1141.
12. The case was heard before Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldisert and Rosenrr. Judge
Rosenn delivered the opinion of the court.
13. 570 F.2d at 1150. Before disposing of the case on the merits, the Third Circuit held that
the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the class action. Id. at
1142-44. Gulf contended that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, citing
several cases which held that, absent diversity, federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction
over traditional state law claims because the activity is regulated by a federal agency. Id. at
1142-44. See, e.g., Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 359 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1966).
The Third Circuit distinguished the principal case because the plaintiffs were relying directly upon a breach of federal law as the basis of their claim for relief. 570 F.2d at 1143. This
matter was held to be a federal question arising under the laws of the United States, thus falling
within the court's federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 1144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The
court cited Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), for the proposition that a claim for relief under a
federal statute falls under federal subject matter jurisdiction where that claim is not wholly
insubstantial or frivolous, is not made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction,
and does not appear to be immaterial under the statute. 570 F.2d at 1143, citing Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946). See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under
Statutes Not Affording Such Remedies, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1090 (1948).
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with a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Clark v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 570 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978).
The interstate transportation and sale of natural gas was first brought
under federal regulation in 1937 when Congress enacted the Natural Gas
Act. 1 4 Prior to that time, purchasers of natural gas, such as distribution
companies, municipalities, and ultimately consumers, were forced to pay
rates which were determined solely according to the discretion of the gas
supply companies1 5 since the industry, which operated primarily on an interstate basis, had effectively avoided state regulation. 16 By enacting a
scheme of nationwide federal regulation, it was the express intention of
Congress "that natural gas ... [should] be sold in interstate commerce for
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial,
or any other use at the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the
maintenance of adequate service in the public interest." 17
To accomplish this objective, Congress conferred jurisdiction upon the
FPC over the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas I and imposed
strict limitations upon the commercial activity of gas suppliers.1 9 To enforce
these regulations, the FPC was granted the authority to conduct investigations,2 0 to hold hearings to determine the reasonableness and adequacy of
service, 2 ' to issue orders to carry out its findings, 22 and to impose sanctions
upon suppliers who fail to comply with the Act or any orders issued by the
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
15. See 81 CONG. REC. 6723 (1937).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). While states have full power to
regulate sales within their borders, the United States Supreme Court has declared that they
cannot interfere with interstate transactions in natural gas. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265
U.S. 298 (1924).
In its report, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated: "The basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that
the States may not act." H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1937). See also 83
CONG. REc. APP. 2422 (1938), where Senator Wheeler observed: "[T]he natural gas business
has developed from a local to a national industry, requiring Federal regulation complementary
to State regulation in order to adequately protect the consuming public." Id.
17. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 7(c), 52 Stat. 825 (1938). This provision was deleted when
§ 7(c) was amended by the Act of Feb. 7, 1942, Pub. L. No. 444, § 7, 56 Stat. 83 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976)). For the Third Circuit's interpretation of the legislative
purpose of the Act, see notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 709. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976). Specifically, the Act restricts natural gas companies
by declaring that unjust or unreasonable charges are to be unlawful, id. § 717c(a), that no
company can extend undue preference or disadvantage to any individual, id. § 717c(b)(1), and
that all suppliers must maintain a schedule of rates and charges open for public inspection. Id.
§ 717c(c).
20. Id.§ 717m(a).
21. Id. § 717m(b).
22. Section 5(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint
. ..shall find that any rate charge or classification .. .or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract . .. is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the
Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same
by order: . . .

15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
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FPC.2 3 Furthermore, the Act authorized the FPC to seek judicial enforcement of its orders 24 and provided criminal sanctions for a breach of its provisions,2 5 but did not afford private, civil relief for such violations.
The United States Supreme Court has found implied private rights of
action, however, under numerous federal statutes which do not expressly
provide for such relief.2 6 The first case in which the Supreme Court allowed an implied private action was Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby,2 7 in which a railroad was held liable for injuries resulting from a
violation of the Federal Safety Appliances Act.2 8 In deciding that the injured party was entitled to recover for a violation of the federal statute, the
Court stated that "[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover damages from the party
9
in default is implied according to a doctrine of the common law." 2
The Supreme Court subsequently refused to imply a private cause of
action, however, in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co.,3 ° where it found that a3 claim asserted for the statutory right to
"reasonable rates" for fuel supplies ' fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the FPC. 3 2 The Court therefore concluded that it had no power to create

23. Id. § 717o.
24. Id. § 717s(a).
25. Id. § 717t.
26. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV.
285 (1963). For a compilation of the Supreme Court cases allowing such relief, see note 34
infra.
27. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
28. Id. at 39. See Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). The Federal Safety
Appliance Act, however, is no longer considered to provide a basis for an implied cause of
action. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Jacobsen v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
29. 241 U.S. at 39. The Court was referring to the common law doctrine that, for every
right created by statute, courts must provide a remedy to give effect to that right. Id. See also
Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). For a more modern application of this doctrine, see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where the Court stated that "it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose." Id. at 433. For a more detailed discussion of Borak, see note 35 and
accompanying text infra.
30. 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
31. Id. at 250. The plaintiff's claim was grounded upon the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-828c (1976). Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976), mandates
that all rates charged be just and reasonable. Id. See 341 U.S. at 250. The Natural Gas Act
contains a similar provision at § 4(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a); note 19 and accompanying text
supra.
32. 341 U.S. at 251-52. The determination of "reasonable rates" is a matter of administrative
discretion and falls within the particular agency's "primary jurisdiction." See United States v.
Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court
cannot resolve a dispute within its jurisdiction which involves an issue that is within the control
of an administrative body and requires the exercise of special knowledge or skill held by that
agency. 352 U.S. at 63-64. Before a court can take action on that issue, the agency must have
rendered a final decision or the plaintiff must have exhausted all administrative remedies. See
Annot., I L. ED. 2d 1596 (1956); Annot., 94 L. ED. 806 (1949); O'Neil, Public Regulation and
Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 231 (1964).
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an independent judicial remedy in the absence of an agency determina33
tion.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court extended the implied private action doctrine to violations of other statutory provisions, 34 but limited its application
to those cases where a private cause of action was necessary in order to
effectuate the statute's legislative purpose. 35 In each case the Court determined whether a private remedy was required by construing the statute's
legislative purpose, 36 and denied those claims where Congress could not
37
have "intended" to afford such protection to the private individual.
33. 341 U.S. at 251-52. Regarding the individual's right to reasonable rates under the Federal Power Act, the Court stated that
the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes,
and that, except for review of the Commission's orders, the courts can assume no right to
a different one on the ground that, in its opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable
one.
Id.
34. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (§ 10(b),
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. IV); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969) (§ 5, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (§ 15 of the Rivers and Harbours Act of 1899,
33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976)); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301(a), National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976)); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970)).
35. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak the Court allowed a private
remedy for a fraudulent proxy solicitation in violation of § 14(a) of the Securites Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). 377 U.S. at 433. In so doing, the Court explicitly granted
private relief only as a "necessary supplement" to the express provisions of the statute required
to carry out its underlying legislative purpose. Id. at 432. The Court implied the congressional
intent to create this remedy because it was the only effective way to enforce the provisions of
the statute. Id.
While this case involved a clear need for judicial relief, the Borak decision failed to announce explicit standards for the the implication of private remedies under statutes. While
courts invoked the "necessary supplement" test in deciding whether to imply private remedies,
this analysis became difficult to apply. See Comment, Private Rights From Federal Statutes:
Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454 (1968). This problem led to the
Court's declaration of more explicit standards in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See notes
38-42 and accompanying text infra.
36. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). In Wyandotte, the Court granted civil relief to the federal
government under § 15 of the Rivers and Harbours Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976),
although the statute did not expressly provide for such a remedy. 389 U.S. at 197-98. The
Government sought relief for the removal of a submerged ship from a navigable waterway when
the defendant's failure to do so was in direct violation of the provisions of that statute. Id. at
197. The Court reasoned that such relief was necessary to effecutate the statutory purpose of
keeping the water course free from dangerous obstructions. Id. at 201, 204. Since the relief
provided by the state was inadequate to compensate the Government for this necessary expense, a private remedy was implied. Id. at 202-06.
37. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974), in which the United States Supreme Court declined to imply a private cause of action
for the enforcement of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 45 U.S.C. §§
501-65 (1970). 414 U.S. at 464-65. The action was brought by an organization of rail commuters
which sought to enjoin the discontinuance of certain unprofitable train routes. Id. at 454. The
Court determined the congressional intent to'deny a private remedy by examining the legislative history and by deciding whether an implied cause of action would be consistent with the
purposes of the Amtrak Act. Id. at 457-65. The Court found that Congress had expressly re-
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court has refined its analysis
mulating a four-part test to determine whether private relief should
plied under a federal statute. In Cort v. Ash, 38 the Court held that a
cause of action for a violation of the Federal Election Campaign
197139 could not be implied,40 stating:

by forbe imprivate
Act of

In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is
the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," . . .- that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one? . ..Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action
41
based solely on federal law?
The Supreme Court thus clarified the earlier case law in Cort by providing
federal courts with a set of standards for determining whether a federal stat42
ute creates a private right of action by implication.
Prior to the Clark decision, only one federal circuit court had directly
decided whether a private cause of action could be implied under a provision of the Natural Gas Act. In a pre-Cort decision, FarmlandIndustries v.
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co.,4 3 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court decision 44 awarding private relief
jected a private right of action when the statute was drafted. Id. at 458-61. Furthermore, the
Court decided that a private right of action would contradict the legislative purpose of the
statute. Id. at 461-65. Specifically, the Court held that a private right to dispute every proposed
discontinuance would conflict with the purpose of § 404, 45 U.S.C. § 564 (1970 & Supp. V
1975), which allows Amtrak to eliminate uneconomic routes without prior federal regulatory
approval. 414 U.S. at 461-62. To allow private injunction of Amtrak's authority to discontinue
routes would subject Amtrak to multiple, and possibly inconsistent, lawsuits in every federal
district in which it operated. Id. at 463-64. Congress thus could not have "intended" such
private enforcement of the statute, and no cause of action could be implied. Id. at 464.
38. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-607 (1976). The defendant had acted in violation of § 610, which
prohibited campaign contributions from corporations in federal elections. 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970)(repealed 1970).
40. 422 U.S. at 85. In so ruling, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had held that a private cause of action was
an appropriate remedy. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), noted in the Third Circuit
Review, 20 VILL. L. REV. 615 (1975).
41. 422 U.S. at 78, (emphasis by the Court) (citations omitted).
42. See Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Catise of Action and the Federal Aviation Act:
A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VILL. L. REV. 657, 658 (1978). In that article,
however, the authors note that the criteria established by Cort have not led to certainty in the
law, but have increased the degree of litigation in this area. Id. at 658-59.
43. 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 318. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska conducted an
exhaustive review of the decisions which had confronted the issue of whether a federal court
should imply a private cause of action for the breach of a federal statute. See Farmland Indus.
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for the termination of boiler gas service, without prior approval by the FPC,
after expiration of a delivery contract.4 5 Upon finding that the gas supplier
had a continuing duty to deliver gas, 4 6 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
termination was a violation of a federal right for which there must be a
concurrent federal remedy, 47 and thus held that the natural gas company
48
was liable for the resulting harm.
Rejecting the Farmland holding, the Clark court applied the four-part
Cort test 49 and concluded that no cause of action could be implied under
the Act. 50 Initially, the court determined that the plaintiffs were among the
class to be protected by the Act because "the overall purpose of the Natural
Gas Act is to protect the interests of consumers in an adequate supply of gas
and at reasonable rates." 51 Under the second part of the Cort analysis, the
court considered whether there was any indication of legislative intent to
create or deny a private cause of action under the Act, 52 and rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the exclusive grant of jurisdiction in the federal
courts for all actions arising under the Act was a sufficient indication of such
54
intent. 53 The Clark court narrowly construed this jurisdictional provision,
stating that "[t]he grant of jurisdiction in the district courts need not be read

v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 677-81 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d
315 (8th Cir. 1973). The district court concluded that it was appropriate to imply a private cause
of action for a breach of a provision of the Act. 349 F. Supp. at 681.
45. 349 F. Supp. at 683. The district court awarded compensatory damages and declaratory
relief for the abandonment of boiler gas service without prior Commision approval, in violation
of§ 7(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976). 349 F. Supp. at 683. See note 6supra. The court
declined to award damages and injunctive relief for allegedly unreasonable increased rates,
however, holding that a federal court should not imply such a remedy when other relief was
available. 349 F. Supp. at 681-82. See notes 87-94 & 96 and accompanying text infra.
46. 486 F.2d at 317.
47. Id. See note 29 supra.
48. 486 F.2d at 317.
49. See text accompanying note 41 supra for an enumeration of the Cort requirements for
the implication of a cause of action from a federal statute.
50. 570 F.2d at 1145-50.
51. Id. at 1145-46.
52. Id. at 1146-48.
53. Id. at 1146. Section 22 of the Act states in pertinent part:
The District Courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this chapter or the rules, regulations, and orders thereunder, and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by or to enjoin any
violation of, this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 717u (1976). The United States Supreme Court did grant a private remedy under
a similar provision, § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), in J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See note 35 supra. The Third Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court has since refused to imply a cause of action under the same statute, even
though it still contains the § 27 grant of jurisdiction. 570 F.2d at 1146. See Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indust., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). A provision thus granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts for a
breach of a statute was considered inconclusive evidence of legislative intent to create a private
remedy. 570 F.2d at 1146.
54. 570 F.2d at 1146.
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as extending beyond those causes of action expressly provided for elsewhere
55
in the Act."
Having failed to find an express legislative intent to grant or deny a
private cause of action, 5 6 the court proceeded to analyze "the congressional
scheme under the Natural Gas Act to determine whether a private cause of
action was necessary to effectuate the policy and purpose of that
scheme." 57 The court examined several provisions of the Act, 58 and observed that Congress vested broad regulatory powers in the FPC to maintain
the operation of this industry and to ensure the availability of natural gas. 59
The Clark court concluded that a private cause of action for damages was not
contemplated by Congress since it evidently intended "to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme for the transportation and sale of
natural gas in interstate commerce, built upon a carefully conceived and
60
structured system for enforcement of the Act's provisions."
The Third Circuit cited the decision of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co. 61 as a mandate by the United States Supreme Court that complex matters of relief for violations of fuel regulatory
statutes should be decided by the administrative agencies which possess the
special skill and resources to determine an appropriate remedy. 62 The court
thus decided that an implied cause of action would not meet the third Cort
criterion of consistency with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme. 6 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned that since Congress had
meticulously created a uniform system of regulation for the entire natural gas
industry, any judicial intervention on the private level could disrupt and
conceivably destroy this scheme. 64
55. Id. See § 20 of the Natural Gas Act, which authorizes the FPC to bring an action in
federal court to enforce any provision of the Act, or any order which the Commission issues
thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) (1976). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
56. 570 F.2d at 1146.
57. Id. at 1146-47. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
58. 570 F.2d at 1147-48. First, the court examined §§ 7(b), (c), and (e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
9 717f(b), (c), (e) (1976), relied upon by the plaintiffs as supporting their implied cause of
action, which Gulf allegedly violated by making reduced deliveries of gas. 570 F.2d at 1145.
These provisions require natural gas companies to obtain Commission approval before abandoning any portion of their service, and to procure a certificate of public convenience and necessity
before engaging in any new transactions in natural gas. Id. at 1147. The court proceeded to
discuss §§ 4, 5, 8(b) and 8(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, d, g(b), g(c) (1976), which impose a duty on
the Commission to provide the public with fair and reasonable rates, and grants the FPC the
power to hold hearings to make this determination. 570 F.2d at 1147-48. Finally, the court
noted that §§ 14, 16, and 20(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717m, o, s(a) (1976), grant the Commission broad
administrative power to investigate alleged violations, to issue orders and discontinue them, and
to seek judicial enforcement of its commands. 570 F.2d at 1147-48.
59. 570 F.2d at 1148.
60. Id.
61. 341 U.S. 246 (1951). For a discussion of Montana-Dakota, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
62. 570 F.2d at 1149.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1149-50. At this point, Chief Judge Seitz, while concurring with the result of the
case, departed from the opinion of the majority. He found that this particular view was not
essential to the outcome of the case and was of questionable validity. Id. at 1150 n.12 .
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In arriving at this conclusion, the Clark court distinguished the contrary
result reached by the Eighth Circuit in Farmland,65 upon which the plaintiffs heavily relied. 6 6 The court noted that Farmland, which preceded the
Cort decision, did not apply the principles established by the Cort quadripartite test.6 7 Moreover, the Farmland decision was predicated upon a
"permanent cessation" of gas deliveries, 68 while the instant case involved
only a reduction in service. 69 The Third Circuit found these distinctions to
be crucial, and thus determined that the Farmland analysis was inapplicable
70
to the Clark facts.
Finally, the Third Circuit emphasized that the relief sought by the
plaintiffs was not in the traditional form of damages71 since any award would
have to be refunded to Gulf pursuant to a recoupment schedule devised by
the FPC. 7 2 In addition, the court reasoned that the resetting of rates and
the conduct of recoupment proceedings were most effectively left to the
agency.73 The Clark court therefore determined that "[u]nder these conditions, an implied cause of action for damages does not add significant additional protection for ultimate consumers of gas but might well disrupt the
congressional scheme devised for the regulation of an essential industry and
74
for the protection of the public generally."
In deciding Clark, the Third Circuit correctly concluded that an implied
cause of action would not advance the legislative purpose of the Natural Gas
Act. 7 5 While, the Act is ultimately intended to protect consumers, 76 the
65. For a discussion of Farmland, see notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
66. 570 F.2d at 1148-49.
67. Id. at 1148. As authority for this requirement, the Third Circuit relied upon its earlier
decision in Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, 523 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1975), where it had
held that all private actions implied under a federal statute must be tested against the standards
established by Cort. 570 F.2d at 1148.
68. 486 F.2d at 317.
69. 570 F.2d at 1148.
70. Id. at 1148-49. See notes 83-96 and accompanying text infra.
71. 570 F.2d at 1145, 1150.
72. Id. at 1145. See note 7 supra. The plaintiffs admitted the necessity of returning all
refunds paid by Gulf, as shown by plaintiff-intervenor Philadelphia Gas Work's (PGW) claim for
relief, which stated:
What PGW seeks . . .is immediate monetary relief to cover fully the costs PGW incurred
in securing replacement gas over and above the limited monetary relief afforded by the
FPC. As with the monetary relief secured from the FPC, PGW concedes the necessity of
restoring such amounts to Gulf based on the timetable set forth by the FPC in opinion
No. 780.
570 F.2d at 1145, quoting Brief for Appellant Philadelphia Gas Works at 28, Clark v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 570 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978).
73. 570 F.2d at 1150. This factor led the Third Circuit to conclude that the fourth element
of the Cort analysis, the availability of alternative state remedies, was not relevant to the
determination of the implied cause of action. Id. Plaintiff's requested relief was dependent upon
the FPC's complex recoupment schedule. See note 7 supra. Since this is not an area "traditionally relegated" to state law, the court found that this consideration was not relevant to the Clark
case. 570 F.2d at 1150.
74. 570 F.2d at 1150.
75. See id. at 1150.
76. Id. at 1145-46. The court looked to the United States Supreme Court for the proposition
that the "primary aim" of the Act is "the protection of consumer interests against exploitation at
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method chosen by Congress to achieve this end was "a comprehensive and
77
effective regulatory scheme for the transportation and sale of natural gas."
The provisions of the Act thus allow for a uniform system of management of
all gas suppliers. 78 The Act does not concern itself with the rights of consumers in the event of default by those suppliers, but rather vests broad
administrative powers in the FPC to insure that these consumers are protected in such cases. 79 Since the "policy and purpose" of the Act is to erect
this regulatory structure, 80 private enforcement by consumers would not be
a "necessary supplement" to this legislative scheme. 8 ' Furthermore, the
creation of a new private remedy under the Act would permit unwarranted
judicial intervention into a domain expressly delegated to a federal agency,
82
in contravention of the design of the governing statute.
While the Third Circuit correctly applied the Cort principles to the
instant case, it is submitted that the court failed to adequately distinguish
the contrary precedent of Farmland.8 3 The court summarily dismissed the
outcome in Farmland since that case was decided prior to the promulgation
of the quadripartite Cort test.8 4 The Clark court failed to note, however,
that the Farmland court affirmed a district court decision 85 which invoked
all of the principles subsequently established by Cort.8 6 By neglecting to
recognize this correlation, the Third Circuit disregarded a well reasoned decision which invoked a private cause of action for a similar breach of the
Natural Gas Act.
The Clark court relied upon Montana-Dakota87 as more persuasive authority for denying relief in the instant case. 8 Montana-Dakota involved a
the hands of the natural gas companies." Id. at 1146, citing FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 610 (1944).
77. 570 F.2d at 1148. See notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
78. For a discussion of pertinent regulatory provisions of the Act, see notes 18-25 and accompanying text supra.
79. 570 F.2d at 1148. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
80. 570 F.2d at 1147-49.
81. Id. at 1150. See notes 35-37 & 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
82. 570 F.2d at 1150. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
84. 570 F.2d at 1148. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
85. 349 F. Supp. 670 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd., 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973).
86. 349 F. Supp. at 679. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
applied the following criteria for implying a private remedy under the Natural Gas Act:
Before a specific private remedy, either equitable or legal, may be found in a congressional Act not expressly granting one, it must appear that (1) the plaintiff is within a class
intended to be protected by the Act, (2) private enforcement will further the congressional policy of the Act, (3) the duty breached was created by the Act rather than by state
statutory or common law, (4) the violation of the duty affected the plaintiff directly, and
(5) no other remedy is available to guard adequately the right asserted.
Id. For a comparison with the Cort test, see text accompanying note 41 supra. Although the
Farmland decision preceded Cort, it applied many of the same considerations in deciding
whether a cause of action can be implied under the Natural Gas Act. By summarily dismissing
Farmland as superseded by Cort, the Third Circuit failed to answer many of the important
questions raised by the outcome in that case.
87. For a discussion of Montana-Dakota, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
88. 570 F.2d at 1149.
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claim for allegedly excessive rates,8 9 in violation of the Federal Power Act, 90
which was denied by the Supreme Court because the controlling federal
agency had not decided which rates were "reasonable" under the circumstances. 9' The Third Circuit found the claim asserted in Clark analogous since, in that case as well, the regulatory agency possessed the knowledge and flexibility to award effective relief.92 The Clark court's reliance
upon Montana-Dakota seems inapposite, however, because the plaintiffs
there attempted to assert rights which could be determined solely by a regulatory agency, before the agency had rendered a decision, 93 while the
Clark plaintiffs' claim was based on a violation of the certificate of public
convenience and necessity issued by the FPC. 94 The relief sought in Clark
was therefore analogous to the consequential damages awarded in Farmland
as a result of the violation of a preexisting obligation owed to the plaintiffs. 95 In light of the correlation between the violations in Clark and Farmland, as distinguished from the claims asserted in Montana-Dakota,96 it is
submitted that the court should have offered stronger support for distinguishing Farmland on the basis of the type of relief which was granted.
In not allowing an implied cause of action, future application of the
result in Clark may deny adequate relief to consumers injured by forthcoming defaults in fuel deliveries. After its hearings on Gulf's violations, the
FPC acknowledged its inability to effectively compensate consumers, 97 and
suggested that further relief be sought within the court system. 98 By refusing to grant judicial relief, however, the Third Circuit failed to act upon this
deferral, 99 thus denying the plaintiffs complete recovery for Gulf's shortages.
Absent reversal of agency action, therefore, this result will effectively limit
89. 341 U.S. at 250.
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976). See note 31 supra.
91. 341 U.S. at 251. See notes 32 & 33 supra.
92. 570 F.2d at 1149. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
93. 341 U.S. at 251-52. See note 33 supra.
94. 570 F.2d at 1144-45. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
95. Compare the provisions of § 7(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976), quoted in note 6
supra, with those of § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976), enumerated in note 4 supra. The sections are parallel in that they forbid certain actions, committed by the defendants in Farmland
and Clark respectively, without prior approval of the FPC.
96. The distinction between the two claims is clearly illustrated by the district court decision in Farmland, where the court denied a claim for allegedly unreasonable rates, holding that
other adequate relief was available, while allowing damages for an abandonment of gas deliveries. 349 F. Supp. at 681-82. See note 45 supra.
97. F.P.C. Op. No. 780, UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH) 11,869 (Oct. 15, 1976). Specifically,
the FPC refused to grant the relief request by the plaintiffs because "conditioning relief upon
actual proof of the myraid effects of Gulfs non-delivery could lead to endless proceedings." Id.
98. 570 F.2d at 1142. See F.P.C. Op. No. 780-A, UTIL. L. REP. FED. (CCH)
11,882
(Dec. 9, 1976). In that opinion the FPC stated:
The formula may or may not cover all the effects of Gulfs non-delivery, and the Commission's decision to order the payment of refunds does not prevent PGW or other customers
and distributing companies served through Texas Eastern's system from seeking additional
relief in whatever forum they choose if they find that relief inadequate.
Id. In response, however, the Third Circuit found that that regulatory body was better qualified
to apportion adequate relief. 570 F.2d at 1149.
99. 570 F.2d at 1149. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
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consumers' ability to recover to the award granted by the regulatory agency,
regardless of whether that award corresponds to the consumers' actual damages.
While the court's decision in Clark may thus preclude full judicial relief
to consumers aggrieved by fuel shortages, the Clark opinion can be viewed
as a strong policy statement concerning separation of powers. The court did
not reach the question of the adequacy of the agency's award, but rather
decided the case on the issue of whether the judiciary or an administrative
agency should enforce a federal regulatory statute.' 00 By refusing to grant
complete compensation under the statute, the decision can be read as declaring a strong precedent against judicial interference in an area regulated by
a federal agency.
Francis X. Clark
100. See 570 F.2d at 1147-50; notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
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